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1 Introduction 
 
The European Union is a major player in world fisheries in both the catching sector and in 
international trade. It is the second largest producer after China, accounting for 5% of world 
fisheries catches and aquaculture production (EC, 2006). The EU is the world’s biggest net 
importer of fisheries products and is increasingly dependent on imports for its fish supply.  
 
EU countries imported 7.9 million tonnes of fish and fisheries products worth € 23.5 million in 
2004, and exported 5.4 million tonnes of fish worth € 14.2 million. As such, the EU accounted 
for 40 % of global fisheries imports and 25 % of exports. However, a significant proportion of 
this (45 % of imports and 70 % of exports) is due to trade between EU countries (intra-EU 
trade) and much of the imports are to supply the EU’s processing sector with raw material. 
Nevertheless, the EU is a net importer of 2.5 million tonnes of fish from outside the EU. 
 
The EU fishing fleet operates in all the major ocean areas and also in the waters of specific 
countries under bilateral arrangements. Some 3,000 vessels operate outside of Community 
waters, both to the north and south of European waters (EC,2001).  
 
The EU’s trade policies define the rules that govern imports of fisheries products to the EU, 
an important market for many developing countries. The EU’s fisheries policies have 
influenced the activities of catching sector, bringing about the current situation of the external 
fleet, and also having an impact on developing countries whose fish stocks they target. There 
may be examples where the trade policies have reinforced the fisheries policies for the 
external fleet. 
 
This study was commissioned by the UK Department for International Development to review 
the elements of EU fisheries and trade policies and assess their impact on international trade 
in fish and fisheries products.  
 
1.1 Key issues 
 
In particular, two specific questions were raised: 
 
• If the EU accounts for 30 per cent of global fisheries trade, is it the most efficient 
processor of fisheries products in the world today? 
• Has EU fisheries policy created trade distortions in international trade in fish and 
fisheries products? 
 
Other key issues include: 
• What are the main fish and fisheries products traded with Europe and what are their 
sources and destinations? 
• Does the EU capture a disproportionate amount of world fisheries trade compared with its 
consumption of fisheries products? 
• If so, have EU fisheries policies influenced this? In particular, what influence, if any, do 
the EU’s bilateral fisheries agreements have on international trade in fisheries products? 
• What are the likely impacts of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) negotiations and the 
EU’s forthcoming Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with African, Caribbean and 
Pacific countries, on trade in fisheries products? 
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1.2 Approach 
 
To consider the key issues above, the main elements of the EU’s fisheries and trade policies 
were reviewed, and their influence and impacts on trade were considered.   
 
Fisheries trade statistics from FAO and Eurostat as well as data from other sources were 
analysed to answer questions on whether the EU captures a disproportionate amount of 
world trade in fisheries products, and the impact that its fisheries and trade policies may have 
had.  
 
This analysis was used as a basis to consider the potential impacts on fisheries trade of the 
most-likely outcomes of the WTO round and EPA negotiations, as well as the Fisheries 
Partnership Agreements (FPAs). As much as possible, impacts were assessed for their 
economic, social and environmental outcomes. 
 
In light of this, and considering the foreseen changes taking place in world trading 
arrangements the implications for developing countries were considered and 
recommendations made.  
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2 World Trade in Fishery Products 
2.1 Overview of global production, trade, and consumption 
patterns 
 
In 2002, an estimated 38 million people earned their income through fishery and aquaculture 
production related activities (FAO, 2004). The vast majority of these people live in developing 
countries. The total number of fishers and fish farmers has increased at an average rate of 
2.6% per annum since 1990. 
 
Global fish production reached 140 million tonnes in 2004, up from about 133 million tonnes 
in 2003 (Table 1). Whilst approximately two thirds of the total production still comes from 
capture fisheries the driving force behind recent growth is aquaculture (Lem, 2006). Overall, 
the bulk of fisheries production takes place in developing countries (77 % of 133 million 
tonnes in 2003 (FAO Statistics)) and about 38 % of total production is exported.  
 
Predictions on the development of fisheries supply and the potential growth of aquaculture 
are provided in Appendix 1, based on modelling of global fish supply and demand in 2020 by 
IFPRI and the World Fish Centre (Delgado et al. 2003). These predictions show that world 
fishery and aquaculture production for human consumption was 93.1 million tonnes in 1997, 
and is expected to increase to 130.1 million tonnes by 2020. Developing countries 
contributed 73 %, which is expected to increase to 79 % in 2020. The share of aquaculture to 
global fishery production for human consumption is expected to increase from 30 % to 40 % 
in 2020. China is the single largest producer, providing 33.1 million tonnes in 1997 (35.7 % of 
the total), which is expected to increase to 53.1 million tonnes (41 % of the total) by 2020. 
 
 
Table 1: Global fish supply and exports (in million tonnes) 
 2002 2003 2004 
Capture fisheries production 93 90 95 
Aquaculture 40 43 45 
Total supply 133 133 140 
Developing country exports 27 27 30 
Developed country exports 22 21 23 
Total exports 49 49 53 
Source: Lem, 2006; FAO Statistics 
 
China’s production of capture and aquaculture fisheries has increased rapidly over the last 
two decades making it the single largest producer in both categories. However, the reliability 
of China’s production data has been called into question suggesting that production has 
been systematically overestimated at least since the early 1990s. Lu (1998, quoted in 
Delgado et al, 2003) suggests that institutional incentives that reward or punish local officials 
based on reported productivity may be largely responsible for the increasing distortion. 
 
Capture fisheries is an industry in crisis as the natural resource limits of the oceans, coastal 
regions, and many inland water bodies have been reached (World Bank, 2004). According to 
FAO estimates, approximately half of the stocks (52 %) are fully exploited and therefore 
producing catches close to their maximum sustainable limits, whilst approximately one-
quarter are overexploited, depleted or recovering from depletion (16 %, 7 % and 1 % 
respectively) and need rebuilding (FAO, 2004). This alarming situation is perceived by many 
as jeopardising the livelihoods of fisherfolk in both developing and developed countries. 
Despite some international efforts to reverse this situation, trends have not significantly 
changed during the last few years. 
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Global trade in fisheries products has seen significant growth during the last three decades 
and has reached US$ 71.7 billion in 2004, up from US$ 63.5 billion in 2003 and US$ 8 billion 
in 1976. (Josupeit, 2005, Pawiro, 2006). Table 2 shows the main species and products 
traded, indicating the importance of shrimp and other crustaceans, demersal fish (e.g. cod, 
pollock, haddock, hake), tuna and salmon. Molluscs are also important when taken as a 
group. 
 
Table 2: Fisheries exports by value (2004)  
Species / Products Percentage of total 
export value 
Shrimp 16% 
Groundfish 15% 
Tuna 9% 
Salmon 8% 
Crustaceans (other) 7% 
Small pelagics 7% 
Cephalopods 5% 
Molluscs (other) 5% 
Fish meal 3% 
Freshwater fish 2% 
Fish oil 1% 
Others 22% 
Source: Josupeit (2006) 
 
Developing countries account for approximately half of the global fisheries exports by value, 
and 85% are destined for developed countries. The net receipts of foreign exchange 
earnings (i.e. export minus import values) from fishery commodities for developing countries 
increased from US$ 4.0 billion in 1982 to about US$ 20 billion in 2004 (Vannuccini, 2004; 
Lem, 2006). The importance of fisheries products as a source of export revenue for 
developing countries is demonstrated by the fact that net fish export earnings far outweigh 
their earnings from other food commodities such as coffee, bananas, cocoa, sugar, and tea 
(see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Developing countries’ net exports from commodity trade 
 
Source: Josupeit, 2005, based on FAO statistics 
 
Japan and the USA, followed by Spain, France, Italy, China and the UK, are the main 
importers of fish and fisheries products (Table 3). Taken as a group the EU is the world’s 
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principal importer and exporter (Figure 2), accounting for 40 % of global imports and 25 % of 
global exports in 2003 and 2004. At the same time, one must bear in mind that a significant 
portion of EU trade figures is made up of trade between EU countries (‘intra-EU trade’). For 
example, intra-EU trade in fish, crustaceans, and molluscs was of the order of € 11.218 
billion in 2003 and € 12.415 billion in 2005 (Eurostat, 2006)1. The position of the EU in 
international fisheries trade looks less dominant if this is taken into account (Table 3 and 
Section 4.2), and more in line with other major importers such as Japan and the USA. 
 
China’s international fisheries trade has grown rapidly during the course of the last two 
decades, making it the number one exporter and an important importer. In 2004, the Chinese 
fisheries trade surplus was in excess of US$ 3.5 billion (Lem, 2006). At the same time, the 
country is a net importer of fish (over 500,000 tonnes) due to the importation of significant 
quantities of fish destined either for domestic consumption or for processing of products that 
will be re-exported. As a result, China has become the world’s fourth largest importer behind 
the EU, Japan, and US. 
 
 
Table 3: International trade in fisheries commodities by principal importers and exporters in 
2004  
 
Imports 
 
 
Exports 
 US $ 
billion 
as % of 
world total 
 US $ 
billion 
as % of 
world total
European Union  
(intra + extra EU-25) 
29.193 38.8 European Union  
(intra + extra EU-25) 
17.730 24.8 
European Union 
(extra-EU 25) 
15.029 20.0 European Union 
(extra-EU 25) 
2.673 
 
3.7 
Japan 14.560 19.3 China 6.637 9.3 
USA 11.967 15.9 Norway 4.132 5.8 
Spain 5.222 6.9 Thailand 4.034 5.6 
France 4.176 5.5 USA 3.851 5.4 
Italy 3.904 5.2 Denmark 3.566 5.0 
China 3.126 4.2 Canada 3.487 4.9 
United Kingdom 2.812 3.7 Spain 2.565 3.6 
Germany 2.805 3.7 Chile 2.484 3.5 
Denmark 2.286 3.0 Netherlands 2.452 3.4 
Korea Rep. 2.233 3.0 Vietnam 2.403 3.4 
China, H. Kong 1.908 2.5 United Kingdom 1.812 2.5 
Netherlands 1.837 2.4 China, Taiwan 1.801 2.5 
Canada 1.537 2.0 Iceland 1.770 2.5 
Total world 75.293  Total world 71.508  
Source: Country data are based on FAO Statistics, www.fao.org; EU data are based on Eurostat (2006); 
Exchange rates USD to EUR: 0.8054.  
 
 
                                                
1 Eurostat (2006), External and Intra-European Union Trade, Statistical Yearbook Data 1958 – 2005, 
Edition 2006, European Commission, Luxembourg. 
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Figure 2: Main exporters and importers of fish and fishery products, 2003 (by value) 
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Source: FAO (no date) FAO Support to WTO negotiations 4 – Fisheries trade issues in the WTO;  
N.b.: EU figures include intra-EU trade.  
 
 
 
Fish Utilisation 
 
The bulk of fisheries production is destined for human consumption (79 % in 2003) as 
highlighted in Table 4. Most fish is marketed in fresh form, followed by frozen, cured and 
canned products. Processing of fish into fish meal destined for animal feed is another major 
purpose of production. 
 
There is concern that increasing aquaculture production will lead to increased use of 
fishmeal with detrimental effects for the eco-systems concerned. As a result, the 
development and use of fishmeal substitutes as part of an eco-systems approach is being 
promoted in different parts of the world including the UK.  
 
 
Table 4: Disposition of world fishery production (’000 tonnes) 
 2002 2003 2004 
Total world fishery production 133,651 133,187 140,475 
For human consumption 100,159 102,690 105,632 
   Marketing fresh 52,205 53,159 54,968 
   Freezing 25,971 26,059 26,722 
   Curing (e.g. drying, salting, smoking) 10,693 11,237 11,550 
   Canning 11,289 12,235 12,392 
For other purposes 33,492 30,497 34,844 
   Reduction (e.g. fish meal) 25,403 21,655 25,473 
   Miscellaneous purposes 8,089 8,842 9,371 
Source: FAO Statistics 
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2.2 Key issues in international fisheries trade  
2.2.1 Tariffs 
 
The functions of tariffs (or import duties) include the protection of domestic producers from 
foreign competition and generation of government revenues. Following the GATT Uruguay 
Round, the average tariff on fish products was 4.5 % for developed countries and below 
20 % for developing countries (Ahmed, 2006).   
 
 
Table 5: Average tariff rates (%) by type of seafood for selected countries 
 Raw fish Intermediate 
seafood products 
Processed 
seafood 
EU  10.3 4.0 16.3 
Japan 4.3 2.0 9.0 
US 0.6 1.0 3.3 
Korea 15.3 33.0 20.0 
Canada 0.6 3.0 2.6 
Developing countries (average) 19.4 22.0 23.8 
Source: ICTSD (2006) adapted from Roheim (2004) 
 
 
Average tariff rates for a selection of countries are shown in Table 5. Korea has the highest 
average tariff rates (15 % – 33 %) amongst a selection of industrialised countries. Tariffs 
applied in countries such as Canada, Japan, and USA are below 10 %, whilst the EU has 
most-favoured nation (MFN), i.e. maximum applicable duties, that are on average around 
11 %. Although only 3 % of global fish imports are subject to tariffs above 15 %, there are 
cases of tariff peaks due to tariff escalation2 (Ahmed, 2006). Details on tariffs applicable in 
the EU are contained in Section 3.2.1 and Table 1 in Appendix 2, and issues related to 
preferential market access to the EU are outlined in Section 3.2.2. 
 
With average tariffs that are 19.4 % for raw fish, 22 % for intermediate products, and 23.8 % 
for processed seafood, developing countries have higher tariff rates than developed 
countries (ICSTD, 2006). At the same time, due to trade liberalisation and WTO accession of 
major fish importing and exporting countries (e.g. China), tariffs have declined in many 
developing countries. Table 2 in Appendix 2 contains examples of tariff rates for selected 
developing countries. 
 
It is important to make the distinction between bound and applied tariffs. Bound tariffs (i.e. 
ceilings on customs tariff rates) are only relevant for WTO members (Melchior, 2005). 
Applied tariffs in many cases tend to be lower than bound tariffs, which provides some 
allowance for future tariff increases (ICTSD, 2006) or, if tariff cuts are negotiated on the basis 
of bound tariffs, it may lead to ‘water in the tariffs’ — i.e. cuts in bound tariffs may not affect 
applied rates very much if large gaps exist between the two (Melchior, ibid). 
 
As for applied tariffs one must further distinguish between most-favoured nation (MFN) 
maximum applicable rates, and actually applied rates. The latter take into account 
preferential tariffs for developing countries. 
 
                                                
2 Tariff escalation occurs when tariffs are higher for more processed goods. 
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2.2.2 Non-tariff barriers 
 
As a result of concerns over food safety there are increasingly complex requirements for food 
safety assurance and traceability, both in developed and developing countries. Major 
markets are imposing complex food safety assurance and traceability requirements, 
especially the EU and USA. These requirements present a threat to existing exporters and a 
‘barrier’ to new entrants. Strict quality standards create a bias in favour of countries with a 
highly developed infrastructure and larger suppliers with greater resources. 
 
While various trade round agreements since 1948 have led to a substantial reduction in 
tariffs — which were seen as the major barrier to trade — other forms of regulation have 
developed that have the potential to be used  as a form of protection and to act as barriers to 
trade. These include arbitrary technical barriers and various sanitary and phytosanitary 
regulations. In an effort to reduce the trade-restricting aspects of these regulations, two 
agreements were reached under the Uruguay Round negotiations and adopted by WTO 
members in 1995: 
 
• Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS Agreement);  
• Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). 
 
The SPS Agreement applies only to measures covering food safety, animal and plant life and 
human health. Other technical measures outside this area come within the scope of the TBT 
Agreement. The SPS and TBT Agreements are thus complementary and mutually 
reinforcing. 
 
These agreements have given a new direction to the international food trade, including 
fisheries products. The agreements are intended to ensure that requirements such as food 
quality, labelling and methods of analysis applied to internationally-traded goods do not 
mislead the consumer or discriminate in favour of domestic producers or goods of different 
origin. They also try to ensure a balance between the trade-facilitating aspects of standards 
and their trade-distorting potential. 
 
Some key principles of the SPS Agreement include: 
 
• The sovereign right of a country to put protective measures in place, but these 
measures should not be more restrictive than necessary to achieve the appropriate 
level of protection.  
• The Agreement stresses that SPS measures should be scientifically based as well as 
the importance of risk assessment in determining the appropriate levels of SPS 
measures. 
• Of crucial importance are transparency in the development and implementation of 
measures and the adoption of international standards. 
• The SPS Agreement gives status and legal force to the standards set by the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission. The Codex Alimentarius — or food code — was created in 
1963 by FAO and WHO and has become a global reference point for consumers, food 
producers and processors, national food control agencies and the international food 
trade. 
 
Amongst other things, the WTO Agreement on TBTs seeks to ensure that: 
 
• technical standards and regulations do not create unnecessary obstacles to trade; 
• code of good practice is used; 
• procedures for testing should be fair and equitable; 
• there is no unfair advantage for domestic products as a result of standards; 
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• there is transparency (i.e. notifications). 
 
Examples of technical import requirements may include restrictions on fish (e.g. size, 
presentation); the catch method (e.g. use of turtle excluder devices in shrimp fisheries; 
dolphin-safe tuna fishing), and labelling (e.g. origin of the catch, generic marketing names) 
including the use of eco-labels. In this context, findings from research in India show that SPS 
measures introduced in the 1990s had far more impact at the macro-level than TBT 
measures related to the turtle/shrimp dispute with the USA. Nevertheless, at the micro-level 
the latter also had some negative impacts on the livelihoods of poor fishing communities 
(Salagrama and Koriya, 2006). 
 
2.2.3 Subsidies 
 
Subsidies are seen as a driving force in creating overcapacity in the fishing industry which 
has contributed to overfishing. According to Milazzo (1998), annual aggregate subsidies to 
the fisheries sector were of the order of US$ 14 billion to US$ 20 billion (quoted in World 
Bank, 2004). WWF (2005) estimates that fisheries subsidies amount to at least 
US$ 15 billion per annum. An OECD report estimated that the value of fisheries subsidies in 
OECD countries amounted to US$ 6.4 billion in 2003 (OECD, 2003). 
 
Difficulties related to the assessment of subsidies are related to the lack of notification by 
WTO members, and the fact that some subsidies are ‘un-budgeted’ such as tax concessions. 
Transparency regarding subsidies is a problem because few members of the WTO have 
complied with their obligation to report subsidies. The political sensitivity of the subsidies 
issue is highlighted by the use of euphemisms for subsidy, such as ‘government financial 
transfers’ and ‘economic incentives’. 
 
According to Cox (2006), government financial transfers (GFTs) by OECD countries were of 
the order of US$ 6.7 billion in 2003, which corresponds to 21 % of the value of landings. The 
GFTs were used as outlined in Table 6, with the biggest amounts going to management, 
research, and enforcement (38 %), and infrastructure (34 %). Figure 3 shows the distribution 
of GFTs amongst OECD countries (a) by value and (b) by value as a percentage of landed 
value, respectively. 
 
 
Table 6: OECD Government Financial Transfers to fisheries by programme objective, 2003  
Programme objective Percentage 
Management, research and enforcement 38% 
Infrastructure 34% 
Access agreements 3% 
Decommissioning schemes 8% 
Vessel construction and modernisation 4% 
Income support 6% 
Other 7% 
Source: Cox (2006). 
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Figure 3 GFTs to the OECD fisheries harvest sector, 2003  
(a) Value in USD million 
 
 
(b) Percentage of the value of landings 
 
 
Source: Cox (2006) 
 
OECD (2003) assumes that subsidies to the processing sector are limited. Support to the 
processing sector is primarily due to tariffs on processed products, i.e. market price support 
that is not financed by the governments but by higher prices for consumers, which were 
estimated to be of the order of US$ 400 million in 2000. 
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UNEP (2004) investigates the impacts of eight types of subsidy using a matrix based on two 
key variables: (1) type of  management regime (categorised as ‘open access’, ‘catch control’ 
and ‘effective management’); and (2) level of fleet capacity (expressed as ‘overcapacity’, ‘full 
capacity’, and ‘less than full capacity’). Table 7 summarises the expected impact of eight 
categories of fisheries subsidies on fish stocks under different scenarios of the two key 
variables.  
 
In addition to environmental impacts, subsidies also affect a range of other developmental 
issues such as production, trade patterns, social aspects, and governance. For example, 
fisheries subsidies can affect access to productive resources, distort trade flows, and have 
related social knock-on effects. Governance issues are frequently related to transparency (or 
the lack of it) as far as fisheries subsidies are concerned. 
 
 
Table 7: Impact of eight categories of fisheries subsidies on fish stocks under different 
management regimes and levels of exploitation 
Type of  
management regime
Effective 
management 
Management with 
catch controls 
Open access 
Level of fleet capacity
Over-
cap. 
Full 
cap. 
Less 
than 
full 
Over-
cap 
Full 
cap. 
Less 
than 
full 
Over-
cap. 
Full 
cap. 
Less 
than 
full 
Fisheries infrastructure NH NH NH H H NH H H NH 
Management services NH NH NH NH NH NH NH NH NH 
Access to foreign waters NH NH NH H H NH H H NH 
Decommissioning NH NH --- PH PH --- H PH --- 
Capital costs NH NH NH H H H H H H 
Variable costs NH NH NH H PH PH H H PH 
Subsidies to income NH NH NH PH PH PH H H PH 
Price support subsidies NH NH NH H H PH H H H 
Source: UNEP (2004) 
Key: 
NH = Not harmful    Over-cap. = over-capacity 
PH  = Possibly or probably harmful  Full cap. = full capacity 
H   = Harmful    Less than full = less than full capacity 
--- = Not applicable 
 
 
Subsidies in European fisheries were provided under the Financial Instrument for Fisheries 
Guidance (FIFG) between 1993 and 2006, which was recently replaced with the new 
European Fisheries Fund (EFF). Details of these schemes are covered in Section 3.1.1.  
 
Discussions on fisheries subsidies in the WTO have centered in particular on access fees to 
allow foreign fishing vessels access to fishing opportunities in national waters. Box 1 outlines 
the issue of fisheries access agreements and subsidies in the WTO context, based on a 
submission by UNEP to the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment in July 2006. 
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Box 1 Subsidies and Fisheries Access Arrangements 
(Extract from UNEP Contribution to WTO Committee on Trade and Environment of 7 July 2006 - WT/CTE/W/242) 
 
On 11 May 2006, UNEP, ICTSD, and WWF joined together in Geneva to convene an 
informal dialogue on ‘Development and Sustainability in the WTO Fishery Subsidies 
Negotiations’. The focus of the workshop was on developing country issues in the current 
WTO fisheries subsidies negotiations. Amongst other things, the dialogue included a 
discussion of subsidies related to fisheries access arrangements. In this context, the 
following summarises the key points highlighted, which were included in UNEP’s Contribution 
to the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment of 7 July 2006 (WT/CTE/W/242): 
 
“Participants also discussed at length the issues raised by subsidies associated with fisheries 
access arrangements. This discussion helped clarify some important elements of the 
‘subsidies for access’ question. In particular, there appeared universal agreement that new 
WTO rules should not treat government-to-government access fee payments as ‘subsidies’ 
flowing between distant water fishing nations and host EEZ nations. 
 
In addition, those participants inclined to seek some new disciplines on ‘access subsidies’ 
expressed clear sympathy with the concerns that have been raised at the negotiating table 
by small vulnerable economies, including the fear of limited sovereign states’ flexibility on 
how to negotiate such agreements and use the access fees. Participants from all 
perspectives appeared united in the view that new WTO rules should not impede or 
discourage the access payments on which many small vulnerable economies depend. 
Participants also generally agreed that the lack of transparency of current access 
arrangements poses significant problems. Some suggested that there might be a role for the 
WTO to address these problems.  
 
With participants largely in agreement that access fees themselves should not be considered 
subsidies, the discussion turned to the question whether any other aspect of access 
arrangements should be considered a subsidy under new ASCM [Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures] fisheries subsidies disciplines. While there was no attempt to 
reach a common view on this point, there seemed some basis for agreement that any 
‘subsidy’ that might be found within access arrangements could only arise between the 
distant water fishing nation (DWFN) and its own domestic fishing fleet, on whose behalf the 
DWFN secured access to foreign fishing grounds. In this regard, some participants 
suggested that a subsidy exists to the extent the access fees paid by the DWFN are not 
repaid to the DWFN government by its industry. 
 
Other participants, however, argued that the amount (or even the existence) of a 
government-to-government access payment is irrelevant to the measurement of an access-
related subsidy. According to this view, the proper measure of a subsidy would be the 
difference between the commercial value of the access enjoyed by the private fleet and the 
amount it paid to its government in return for the securing of that access. This raised the 
question whether the same would apply at the domestic level. 
 
The quality of the ‘access subsidies’ discussion suggested, in the chair’s view, that 
governments have more in common on this issue than has been apparent in the negotiations 
so far, and that further technical exploration of the definition of an access subsidy could be 
especially useful.” 
 
NB: The UNEP Contribution makes it clear that it is a summary workshop report, which is neither a 
consensus document nor fully comprehensive. Instead it seeks to review the main issues raised and 
suggestions made by participants. Also, it has been circulated for review to all workshop participants 
before its finalisation. 
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2.2.4 Eco-labelling 
 
Certification and eco-labelling schemes are increasingly considered as a tool to achieve both 
fisheries management and marketing objectives. The objective of such schemes is to create 
market-based incentives for better management of fisheries by creating consumer demand 
for seafood products from well-managed stocks or from sustainable aquaculture (Lem, 
2004). Although there may be some concerns related to issues such as legitimacy, 
credibility, and certification requirements, a slow change of perception appears to be taking 
place. For example, some of the largest retailers in the United Kingdom have now committed 
to source fisheries products from sustainable fisheries (personal communication: Dr 
Oluyemisi Oloruntuyi, Marine Stewardship Council). Nevertheless, observers also point out 
that the positive impact of eco-labelling should not be overestimated despite positive 
tendencies in the UK in that, in the medium term, it appears only to provide niche market 
opportunities. 
 
It has been stressed that certification and eco-labelling schemes should be voluntary and 
price premiums should compensate for the costs of certification and compliance. There is a 
certain danger that large-scale retailers might capture the bulk of the benefits resulting from 
eco-labelling. Also, in particular in developing countries concerns have been raised that 
weaker stakeholders might lose out if they cannot meet the necessary requirements or afford 
to participate in the certification process. The FAO ‘Guidelines for the Eco-labelling of Fish 
and Fishery Products from Marine Capture Fisheries’ should be adhered to in the 
development of relevant schemes (FAO, 2005). Similar guidelines are being developed for 
aquaculture products. 
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3 The EU’s Commercial Fisheries and Trade Policies 
3.1 The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) 
 
The EU’s Common Fisheries Policy provides the framework for the management of fisheries 
both within EU waters (‘Community waters’), and outside EU waters (‘international waters’). 
 
The CFP was established in 1983 as a separate policy from agriculture, through Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 170/83 of 25 January 1983 establishing a Community system for the 
conservation and management of fishery resources. This supplemented the 1976 common 
structural policy for the fishing industry3, introducing measures such as effort limitations, 
restrictions on catches for certain species or species groups, restricted zones, gear 
standards and minimum sizes or weights of fish. This was replaced in 1992 by another 
regulation (No 3760/92). These successive regulations have shown a gradual shift of 
emphasis away from promoting production towards conservation and restricting capacity 
within EU waters.  
 
Here we consider the aspects of the CFP that have an influence on fisheries outside EU 
waters, specifically those relating to the external or distant water fleet. The main aspects are 
financial support for the fleet (Section 3.1.1) and bilateral fishing agreements that allow 
vessels to fish in the waters of other countries (Section 3.1.2). 
 
 
Reform of the CFP 
 
In 2002, certain elements of the CFP were due to be reviewed, and the Commission took the 
opportunity to carry out a broad review of the CFP. The Green Paper in 2001 (CEC 2001) 
identified weaknesses and challenges and presented a number of options for its reform. 
These covered the areas of improving conservation policy, the social, economic and 
environmental dimensions, fleet policy, governance, monitoring control and enforcement and 
external relations.  
 
The subsequent ‘Roadmap’ (CEC 2002) set out an action programme for reform of the CFP 
and a roadmap for its implementation. It includes actions in the field of international fisheries 
to promote and strengthen cooperation and ensure sustainable and responsible fisheries, 
both in terms of its own international fisheries activities as well as in international trade in 
fisheries products. 
 
Whilst the basis of the new CFP is set out in Council Regulation 2371/2002 (EC 2002), topics 
including structural policy, aquaculture, markets and international relations are taken up in 
separate processes and legislation.  
 
The Roadmap specifies that the international element of the CFP will consist of: 
- An Action Plan to eradicate illegal, unreported and unregulated fisheries (IUU); 
- An Action Plan to improve, at the regional and subregional levels, the evaluation of 
stocks that are accessible to Community fishermen outside Community waters; 
- An integrated framework for fisheries partnerships at national and/or regional level  (CEC 
2002b)4; and,  
                                                
3 Council Regulation (EEC) No 101/76 of 19 January 1976 laying down a common structural policy for 
the fishing industry 
4 COM(2002) 637 final 
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- Building, within regional fisheries organisations, new strategic alliances, in particular with 
coastal developing countries. 
 
 
3.1.1 Subsidies 
 
Financial support to the Community’s fisheries sector has been an important component of 
the CFP. Between 2000 and 2006, EU aid to the fisheries sector in Member States 
amounted to € 3.97 billion, and national aid contributed a further € 2.08 billion. Spain was by 
far the largest recipient of EU aid, receiving € 1.7 billion in financial aid for the fisheries sector 
from the EU, 43 % of the total (Figure 4). Of this, € 369.8 million (22 %) was spent on the 
construction of new vessels, and € 281 million (16 %) was spent on processing and 
marketing measures. 
 
Between 1993 and 2006, the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) was the 
major structural fund that supported fisheries in the EU. In January 2007, it was replaced with 
the new € 3.849 billion European Fisheries Fund (EFF) which is similar to FIFG but has a 
wider remit to include diversification that benefits fishing areas (e.g. promotion of tourism, 
skill training etc). However, the emphasis is now on effort-neutral/reducing initiatives, 
especially fuel efficiency (e.g. re-engining of vessels, adoption of more efficient gear).  
 
 
Figure 4: EU aid to the fisheries sector by Member State during the 2000-2006 programming 
period 
ES; 1,712; 44%
IT; 386; 10%
FR; 274; 7%
PT; 218; 5%
UK; 217; 5%
DE; 216; 5%
EL; 211; 5%
DK; 205; 5%
Others; 75; 2%
NL; 38; 1% BE; 37; 1%
FI; 39; 1%
PL; 202; 5%
SE; 74; 2%
IE; 70; 2%
ES
IT
FR
PT
UK
DE
EL
DK
PL
SE
IE
FI
NL
BE
Others
 
Label information: Member State code; value of EU aid in € million; % of total EU aid to fisheries 
sector. 
 
The FIFG was tied in with the other structural funds (the European Social Fund (ESF) and 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) which could augment its support to some 
degree. Over the period 2000 to 2006, 70 % of funding allocated was destined for ‘Objective 
1’ regions (i.e. less prosperous regions).  
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To put this in perspective, 2003–2004 data from the Eurostat Fishery Statistics Pocketbook 
valued the seafood landings of the EU15 member states at € 6.06 billion annually. The FIFG 
allocation was € 0.53 billion annually over the period, or about 9 % of landings value (NAP 
Fisheries and NRI, 2006).  
 
The main problem in assessing subsidies on the EU fisheries sector is the way these tend to 
be confounded with broader socio-economic support. The latter is designed to help 
impoverished regions of the EU catch up with more prosperous regions, and variously 
overlaps with, or focuses on, the fisheries sector. This is not the case for all potentially 
subsidising measures, but does underlie much of this state intervention. Key measures 
include: 
 
• Structural funds, which are justified by the relative poverty of the disadvantaged 
location of the seafood industry in question. The subsidies to the fisheries sector are 
part of wider support to these ‘impoverished’ areas justified by the commitment to 
assist them to move towards EU socio-economic norms (cohesion). Until December 
2006 FIFG was the key fisheries-related fund. 
 
• Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPAs) in which the EU provides financial 
compensation to other countries to allow EU fishing vessels access to fishery 
resources in their EEZ. Part of the financial compensation, which results in a 
reduction of operating costs for the EU distant water fleet, could be construed as 
being subsidies (see Box 1). 
 
• ‘Rescue and Restructuring Aid’: Emergency short-term support justified on the 
basis of the need to assist an industry under excessive stress due to temporary 
external circumstances. Recent fuel price increases are a topical case in point. 
 
• Price support, withdrawal and reference prices are other potential subsidy areas, 
which would be important, were they to be as significant a part of the CFP as they are 
with the CAP. This sets ‘floor’ prices for certain fish species, but does so at prices so 
low that they are often irrelevant. The quantities eligible for withdrawal (being taken 
off the market) are relatively small, and the policy is to reduce this mechanism in the 
future. The fact that the budget for price support has been around € 20 million in 
recent years (0.3% of total EU landings value) suggests that price support measures 
are not a substantial market factor. 
 
 
3.1.2 Fisheries Partnership Agreements 
 
One of the elements of the revised CFP that affects developing countries with fisheries 
resources is the integrated framework for fisheries partnership agreements (CEC 2002b)5  
and the subsequent Council Conclusions (EC 2004)6. 
 
The EU’s fisheries agreements (FAs) with coastal states allow access by European fishing 
vessels to the fisheries resources in third country waters in return for a financial payment. 
Fishing agreements began to proliferate in anticipation of the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This established a 200-mile zone which 
countries could claim as their exclusive jurisdiction, known as the Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ). Prior to this, the fleets of EU member states had traditionally fished in the waters of 
                                                
5 COM(2002) 637 final 
6 11485/1/04 Rev 1 PECHE 254 
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other countries - ‘distant water fleets’ (DWFs). With the establishment of EEZs, it therefore 
became necessary for individual bilateral agreements to be set up in order for these fleets to 
maintain their access to third countries’ waters. 
 
The EU has had fisheries agreements with third countries since 19797 and these began to 
proliferate in the 1980s and in particular with the accession of Spain and Portugal to the EU 
in 1986, who brought with them a number of bilateral agreements with other countries, 
particularly in West Africa.  
 
However, these agreements have been criticised by many social and environmental interests 
that claim the EU is ‘exporting’ excess fishing capacity to third countries where monitoring 
and enforcement is often weak, contributing to over-exploitation of fish stocks, causing 
conflicts with local fleets and small-scale fishers, and capturing the majority of the value-
added from developing countries’ fisheries resources. 
 
The reform of the EU’s fisheries agreements to Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPAs) 
under the new CFP, aims to protect the interests of the EU distant water fleets whilst 
adapting the agreements to sustainable development objectives, developing a ‘partnership’ 
between the EU and coastal states towards responsible fisheries management, development 
and combating IUU fishing, and improving the coherence between the EU’s fisheries policy 
and other policies such as development and environment, amongst others. 
 
The EU currently has 16 FAs or FPAs with developing countries, 15 of which are ACP 
countries. The location of FAs and FPAs are shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5: Map showing the location of current EU FAs and FPAs, and waters under the 
jurisdiction of an EU Member State 
 
Key: 
CI = Côte d’Ivoire; CV = Cape Verde; FM = Federated 
States of Micronesia; GA = Gabon; GN = Guinea 
(Republic of); GW = Guinea-Bissau; KI = Kiribati; KM 
= Comoros; MA = Morocco; MG = Madagascar; MR = 
Mauritania; MU = Mauritius; MZ = Mozambique; SB = 
Solomon Islands; ST = São Tomé & Principe.  
 
                                                
7 The first agreement was signed with Senegal. 
CV 
GA 
MR 
MA 
ST CI GN 
GW 
KM
MGMZ
SC
MU
KI 
FM 
SB 
The Impact of EU Commercial Fisheries Policies and Practice on International Trade in Fisheries Products 
 
18 
3.2 Trade Policies 
3.2.1 Tariffs 
 
Average EU Most Favoured Nation tariffs for fish and fisheries products are around 11 %. 
This is higher than the developed country average of 4.5 %, but lower than some 
industrialised countries’ tariffs such as Korea which range from 15–33 %.  
 
However, the EU implements tariff ‘peaks’ for certain products, in particular for ‘sensitive’, 
processed products such as canned tuna and tuna loins (24 %) and canned or processed 
shrimp and molluscs (20 %). Some of these high tariffs, such as for canned tuna, may have 
the effect of protecting the EU processing industry (and tuna canners in ACP and GSP+ 
countries that have 0 % tariff access to the EU market) from cheap imports from Asian 
canners. Other high tariffs, such as 24 % for tuna loins, may have the effect of protecting the 
EU tuna fleets by making tuna from EU vessels relatively cheaper than from Asian 
competitors.   
 
Whilst EU shipowners benefit from the current high tariffs on tuna loins, which help ensure 
the competitiveness of EU-caught tuna, a reduction of tariffs on tuna destined for processing, 
such as tuna loins, would benefit EU processors by ensuring supply.  
 
Examples of tariffs applicable in the EU on seafood are provided in Table 8 and further 
details are contained in Appendix 2. 
Table 8 Examples of EU import tariffs for seafood 
Item Code Conventional duty Notes 
Fresh freshwater fish (nei) 0302 69 11 8 % Ad valorem throughout 
Fresh marine fish (nei) 0302 69 99 15 %  
Salmon, fresh/frozen fillet 0602 1200, 0303 
11/19/22 
2 % Atlantic & Pacific 
salmon 
Fresh/frozen peneid shrimp 0306 
1350/1380/2390 
12 % i.e. raw farmed shrimp 
Frozen tuna loins 1604 14 16 24 % 4,000t quota at 6 %  
Canned tuna in oil or brine 1604 14 11/18 24 % Quota for Asian 
countries at 12 % 
 
 
3.2.2 Preferential market access for ACP and Least Developed Countries 
 
Whilst the provision of non-discriminatory (i.e. most-favoured nation, or MFN) access to each 
other’s markets is a fundamental principle of the WTO, it permits trade preference 
programmes in order to stimulate development (Fisher, no date). To promote development 
and export-led growth in the developing world, various WTO exceptions allow members to 
give developing countries tariff treatment that is lower than the MFN tariff that a member 
guarantees to all other members.  
 
The EU provides preferential market access to developing countries through different 
schemes, including: 
 
• Cotonou Agreement (ACP countries, 0% tariff), but this arrangement does not comply 
with WTO regulations and the EU only has temporary waiver to put into place other 
arrangements by December 2007; 
• Everything-but-Arms Initiative (EBA) (Least Developed Countries, 0% tariff);  
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• GSP+ (0% tariff)8 is a special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and 
good governance; the predecessor scheme originally focused on ‘Countries Fighting 
Drugs’ but was abandoned due to a conflict in the WTO; 
• Standard GSP (most remaining developing countries; MFN tariff minus 3.5%). These 
new GSP regulations, which came into force on 1 January 2006, also contain 
measures that directly benefit countries affected by the tsunami in South East Asia. 
For example, tariffs for unprocessed shrimp originating from the affected countries fell 
from 12% (MFN rate) to 4.2%.  
• Tariff quotas: whilst EU tariffs are 24% for tuna loins and canned tuna, tariff quotas 
are in place for certain countries (e.g. 12% tariff on 27,750 tonnes of canned tuna 
shared by Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia; 6% tariff on 4,000 tonnes of loins 
destined for processing). 
 
The ACP countries benefit from the Cotonou Agreement, which allows them quota-free 0% 
tariff access for their products to the EU market. This represents a substantial advantage 
over other countries that do not receive 0% tariff access. However, WTO negotiations are 
likely to reduce MFN tariffs for a range of goods, this advantage that ACP countries currently 
enjoy is likely to be reduced. This is known as preference erosion. 
 
Preference Erosion 
 
Developing countries benefiting from preferential market access in developed countries fear 
that tariff cuts resulting from further trade liberalisation (e.g. as a result of the WTO Doha 
Round) will erode the value of those preferences. At the same time, preferential access 
arrangements to the EU market for some Latin American and Asian producers has already 
started to lead to preference erosion for ACP and LDC countries. 
 
Table 9 shows the 20 LDCs benefiting most from market access preferences in the EU, 
Japanese, and US markets.  In addition, there are some fish-exporting ACP countries which  
benefit from preferential market access to the EU but do not appear in the table either 
because they are not LDCs or their total exports entering developed country markets under 
preferential market access are less than those of the 20 countries presented in the table. Full 
details of ACP – EU fisheries trade are presented in Appendix 5. 
 
 
                                                
8 As part of GSP+, the following developing countries benefit from the special incentive arrangement 
for sustainable development and good governance provided for in Regulation (EC) No 980/2005 from 
1 January 2006 – 31 December 2008:  Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Georgia, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Sri Lanka, Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, El Salvador, and 
Venezuela.  
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Table 9 The 20 LDCs benefiting most from market access preferences in the EU, Japanese and 
US markets in recent years (fish products in bold) 
Countries Relevant products 
Angola Crude petroleum oil and preparations thereof; cuttlefish 
and squid 
Bangladesh Frozen fish, shrimps and prawns; urea; leather; jute 
fabrics and bags; garments; linen; tents; footwear; hats 
Madagascar 
 
Frozen shrimps and prawns; vanilla; cloves; preserved 
tuna; garments 
Senegal Fresh and frozen fish and fish fillets; cuttlefish and 
squid; octopus; crude groundnut oil; preserved tuna; 
leather footwear; 
Cambodia Garments; leather footwear 
Nepal Wool carpets; garments; hats 
Democratic Republic of the Congo Crude petroleum oil and preparations thereof 
Myanmar Garments; leather footwear 
Mozambique Frozen shrimps and prawns 
Mauritania 
 
Fresh and frozen fish; cuttlefish and squid; octopus 
Malawi 
 
Tobacco 
Tanzania, United Republic of Fresh and frozen fish fillets; octopus; fresh cut flowers; 
tobacco; preparations of 
petroleum oil 
Uganda Fresh and frozen fish fillets; fresh cut 
flowers; tobacco 
Sudan Crude groundnut oil 
Equatorial Guinea Crude petroleum oil 
Solomon Islands Preserved tuna 
Yemen Preparations of petroleum oil 
Lao People's Democratic Republic 
 
Garments 
 
Zambia 
 
Fresh cut flowers 
 
Guinea Fresh fish 
Source: UNCTAD (2005)   
NB: (a) Ranking of countries and identification of products are based on UNCTAD data on foreign exchange 
earnings from exports of goods and services.  
 
The main ACP countries exporting fish products to the EU in 2002 were (by value, in 
descending order): Namibia, Seychelles, Senegal, Madagascar, Cote d’Ivoire, Mauritania, 
Tanzania, Ghana, Cuba, Mauritius, Mozambique, Uganda, Nigeria, Kenya, Angola, Bahamas 
(Lem, 2005).  
 
The potential effects of preference erosion are assessed below in Section 5.2.1 on the 
impact of a possible WTO-induced reduction of margin of preference through tariff 
reductions. 
 
 
3.2.3 Economic Partnership Agreements  
 
The framework for a new trade and development partnership between the European Union 
and ACP countries was laid out in 2000 in the Cotonou Agreement (Hinkle et al, 2006). The 
trade component of the 1975 Lomé Convention was not WTO compatible in that it offered 
preferential access to EU markets to ACP countries, but discriminated against other 
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developing countries. In light of this, the main driving force behind the EU switch to an 
(eventually) fully reciprocal preferential trade relationship with the ACP is the need for WTO 
compatibility, in particular under GATT (1994) Article XXIV which deals with customs unions 
and free trade areas (Campling, 2006). The negotiation process was formally launched in 
September 2002 as required by the Cotonou Agreement and is set to be concluded by the 
end of 2007 with the creation of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) from 1 January 
2008. Preferential market access for ACP countries under the Cotonou Agreement is 
currently justified within the WTO by a ‘waiver’ that expires at the end of 2007. 
 
EPAs are based on four fundamental principals (Pozzi et al, 2005): 
 
• EPAs are partnership agreements and imply rights and obligations of both sides.  
• EPAs promote regional integration among ACP states as an important device to 
integrate into the world economy.  
• EPAs are primarily instruments for development, taking into account the different 
development levels of ACP states and particularly the situation of LDCs. The 39 ACP 
countries classified as Least Developed Countries (LDCs) will not be required to join 
immediately a regional EPA and will be able to retain their preferential non-reciprocal 
tariff status. 
• EPAs are intended to integrate ACP states into the world economy and will build on 
the provisions of the WTO.  
 
The EPAs are intended to replace the EU’s current unilateral preferences for ACP countries 
with six reciprocal free trade agreements. The six regional groupings are:  
 
• CEMAC (Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa);  
• ECOWAS (Economic Community of West Africa States);  
• ESA (Eastern and Southern Africa) (includes Indian Ocean);  
• SADC (Southern Africa Development Community);  
• CARIFORUM (Caribbean Forum); and  
• Pacific Forum.  
 
Details of countries in each group are provided in Appendix 4. 
 
According to Hinkle et al (2006), the effectiveness of EPAs will depend on the resolution of 
five interrelated sets of problems, namely: 
 
• Poorly integrated regional markets for products; 
• Regional groupings with varying levels of MFN protection, and tariff peaks; 
• Losses in tariff revenues associated with EPA agreements;  
• Unintegrated – and in some case unliberalised – services markets and the Singapore 
issues; 
• Infrastructure and aid for trade. 
 
Box 2 outlines the key issues related to Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs), EPAs and WTO 
Compatibility, in particular in the context of Article XXIV under GATT 1994, and the Enabling 
Clause.  
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Box 2: RTAs, EPAs and WTO Compatibility – Article XXIV and the Enabling Clause 
In Article 36 of the Cotonou Agreement the parties to the agreement concurred to conclude new 
World Trade Organization (WTO)-compatible trading arrangements, removing progressively 
barriers to trade between them. In Article 37, it is agreed that economic partnership arrangements 
(EPAs), including the new trading arrangements, shall enter into force by 1 January, 2008. 
Two WTO rules are most relevant to ensuring the compatibility of the new trading arrangements. 
Firstly, that on regional trade agreements (RTAs), Article XXIV of GATT 1994 and secondly, that 
on special trading arrangements involving developing countries, the Enabling Clause. Given that 
the specific application of these rules is subject to interpretation there is legal uncertainty that 
clouds the conclusion of WTO-compatible trading arrangements. Beyond compliance with the 
rules as they are currently, there is the possibility of revising them in the context of WTO 
negotiations to ensure compatibility, and further that the rules may also change after the EPAs 
are agreed, potentially raising new issues related to compatibility.   
GATT Article XXIV contains the most important rules of the WTO system on Regional Trading 
Arrangements (RTAs). It recognises voluntary agreements, such as customs unions (CUs) or 
free-trade areas (FTAs) that should ‘facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to 
raise barriers to the trade of other contracting parties with such territories’. In both forms of RTAs 
the expectation is to eliminate restrictions on ‘substantially all the trade’ between the constituent 
territories. The main difference between a CU and an FTA is that in the former the national tariffs 
and other trade regulations are generally replaced by a common external tariff and a common 
system of other external regulations of commerce. In the case of an FTA the distinct national 
trade regimes remain intact. 
If EPAs are concluded under Article XXIV the only option seems to be FTAs as it is unlikely that 
ACP countries would introduce roughly the same external trade regime as the EU, as would be 
required under a CU. However, meeting GATT rules remains elusive.   
The Enabling Clause, officially known as the Decision on Differential and More Favourable 
Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries9, is the other important 
source of law relating to RTAs, involving particularly developing countries. The Enabling Clause 
constitutes an exception from GATT Art. I in three senses since it authorises: (a) developed 
country tariff preferences for goods of developing country origin on GSP terms (generalised, non-
reciprocal and non-discriminatory); (b) special treatment for LDCs; and (c) South-South 
preferences as an exception from both Articles I and XXIV. Given that the Enabling Clause 
authorises only South-South RTAs, there is no room for North-South RTAs, such as the future 
EPAs, to be justified under it. Developed countries have failed, on several occasions, to defend 
discriminatory preferences accorded to developing countries on the basis of paragraph 2(c) of the 
Enabling Clause. EPAs therefore would have to be compatible with the regional trade 
arrangements for FTAs or Cus specified in Article XXIV. 
Establishing compatibility of EPAs with WTO rules is a formidable task. Only for one of 270 RTAs 
notified to GATT have members agreed its compatibility with WTO rules.  
Source: FAO and ACP Secretariat (2006)  
 
 
3.2.4 Rules of Origin 
 
Rules of Origin (RoO) specify the tariff applicable to products originating from different places 
and are required to ensure accurate tariff assessment (OECD, 2003). They are particular 
important for ACP countries because only fish that is considered to ‘originate’ from their 
country can be exported to the EU at 0% tariff. Given that fish are caught in many parts of 
the world and are traded in different forms (e.g. raw, semi-processed and processed) rules of 
origin present a particular challenge. As a consequence, the proper use and interpretation of 
                                                
9  GATT doc. L/4903, 28 November 1979. 
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rules of origin enhances the predictability and transparency in international fisheries trade. At 
the same time, from the point of view of exporters, rules of origin can be viewed as a trade 
impediment. 
 
Duty-free access for ACP fishery products to EU markets is governed by the rules of origin 
applied to fishery products as part of the Cotonou Agreement (Protocol I, Annex V) 
(CTA/CFFA, 2005).  To obtain duty-free access, ACP fishery products must be ‘wholly 
obtained’ in the ACP State concerned. The main criteria for defining ‘originating products’ are  
registration and flag, ownership and crewing arrangements on the fishing vessels and factory 
ships, which must basically be either ACP or European.   
 
The restrictions of the rules of origin have led to tensions in EU-fisheries relations, in 
particular with regard to the valuable tuna fishery (CTA/CFFA, 2005). Given that ACP 
countries do not have their own tuna fleets, the way ‘originating fish’ is defined  effectively 
forces their processors to purchase from highly priced EU suppliers, because fish from third 
country vessels is not ‘originating’, even if it is caught within an ACP country’s EEZ.  
 
As a consequence, ACP countries have requested that all catches within their national 
jurisdiction should enjoy originating status regardless of ownership of vessels (see 
CTA/CFFA, ibid, p12). At the same time, trade observers would argue that in some cases 
close links between processors and vessel owners help to overcome some of the 
aforementioned problems. 
 
Under the Cotonou Agreement, a fish product must be ‘wholly obtained’ from an ACP state if 
it is to be eligible for tariff-free access to the EU market. 
 
Amongst other things, this has been 
interpreted by the EU to mean that: 
 
• Raw material must be obtained from fishing conducted there; 
• Raw material must be obtained from fishing by ACP or EU vessels; 
• Vessel registered in ACP or EU; Vessel under flag of ACP or EU; 
• More than 50% of crew must be nationals of ACP or EU countries; 
• At least 50% ownership of vessels by nationals of ACP or EU countries, or by a 
company with its headquarters in ACP or EU, and whose Chairman and more than 
50% of directors are ACP or EU nationals; and, 
• For joint ventures, it is stipulated that more than 50 % of capital belong to ACP or EU 
nationals. 
 
At the same time, there is a value tolerance (i.e. derogation) to the RoO in place, in that the 
value of non-originating fish can be up to 15 % of the ex-works price of the product (on a per 
shipment basis) (Campling, 2006). 
 
There are a number of proposals for reforming the RoO, the two main ones being (i) value-
added method; and (ii) change of tariff heading. The value-added method implies that if 
processing takes place in an ACP country, and a certain percentage of value is added to the 
product, it can be considered as originating in the ACP country, regardless of the original 
source of the raw material. The second method, change of tariff heading, would mean that if 
the product is processed resulting in a change of tariff heading under which the product is 
classified for trade purposes, then it would be considered as originating. The value-added 
method, with 40 % value-added is thought to be the preferred option of the EU. However, 
there is some concern 40 % value-added might be too high for canned tuna and tuna loins 
because of the fish makes up a large proportion of the final value of the product (Campling, 
2007). 
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3.2.5 EU food safety and quality regulations for fishery products 
 
The EU has been at the forefront of developing more stringent laws and regulations. The 
European Commission’s Directorate-General for Health and Consumer Protection (DG 
SANCO) is responsible for food safety in the EU. The main directive affecting fish dates from 
1991. Apart from the main text there have been a series of complementary directives that 
expand upon and clarify the main directive. These are becoming stricter, for example the 
regulations regarding residue monitoring, antibiotics and labelling. Alongside the tightening of 
its food safety legislation, the EU is demanding the adoption by exporting countries of agreed 
inspection, examination and certification procedures. Seafood production in third countries, 
including ACP producers, has to match EU standards in terms of hygiene and food safety. 
This means that it must be covered by the same general principles of food law and food 
safety that exist in the EU. These general principles are laid out in Council Regulation 
178/2002. These various measures can be viewed as non-tariff barriers (NTB) to trade and 
are becoming more restrictive. 
 
EU standards are enforced and regulated at the country level and thus a restriction of fish 
exports to the EU under the regulations affects all members of the export community. The 
EU has adopted a two tier approach: a country has to be licensed to export fish to the EU, 
and then each individual exporting company has to apply to the ‘competent authority’ (CA) 
within the exporting country for permission to export. This two tier system in effect means 
that the EU delegates authority for implementation and enforcement of its food safety 
legislation to the authorities in the exporting country. The CA is responsible for official 
controls throughout the production chain, which cover all relevant aspects of hygiene, public 
health and, in the case of aquaculture products, also animal health. All bilateral negotiations 
and other relevant dialogue concerning trade in fishery products are undertaken by the 
national CA, including private sector communications with the EU. 
 
Currently out of a total of 79 ACP countries some 27 have satisfied the criteria to export fish 
to the EU and are included on ‘List 1’ (see Table 10 and  http//forum.europa.eu.int/irc/sanco/ 
vets/info/data/listes/ffp.html). The countries with a fisheries agreement that are on List 1 are 
characterised as those that have significant exports of fisheries products to the EU. There 
are several countries that have an Fisheries Partnership Agreement (FPA) or a Fisheries 
Agreement (FA) with the EU that are not on List 1 to export to the EU, namely the Comoros, 
Guinea-Bissau, Micronesia, Sao Tome & Principe, Equatorial Guinea, and the Solomon 
Islands, while Angola which formerly had an FA also does not have permission.  
 
This is not necessarily an impediment to the entry of fish to the EU from that country, in 
particular where a fisheries agreement exists. Even if a country does not fulfill EU 
requirements, fish may be caught in its waters by an EU vessel and landed directly in the EU. 
In addition, some countries are included on ‘List II’ and are authorised to export fish and 
fishery products to certain EU countries on a bilateral basis, such as Fiji to the UK10.  
 
 
                                                
10 Part II of the list (valid until 31/12/2003 not withstanding a possible short extension of the date currently under discussion) 
contains the 32 so-called "pre-listed" countries which, although not yet inspected by the Commission's Food and Veterinary 
Office, have been judged to have equivalent legislation and controls. Member States may choose to import (or not to import as 
the case may be) bilaterally from the countries included in List II and the fishery products imported from such countries are to be 
marketed only in the Member State which imports them.  
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Table 10: ACP Countries authorised to export fish and fishery products to the EU (List 1) 
Countries with a fisheries agreement with the EU ACP countries with no fisheries 
agreement with the EU 
Countries on List 1 Countries not on List 1 Countries on List 1 
Cape Verde 
Gabon 
Guinea 
Ivory Coast 
Madagascar  
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mozambique 
Seychelles 
 
Comoros 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
São Tomé & Principe 
Solomon Islands 
Micronesia 
Kiribati 
Antigua & Barbuda 
Bahamas 
Belize 
Cuba 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Grenada 
Jamaica 
Kenya 
Namibia 
Nigeria 
Papua New Guinea 
Senegal 
South Africa 
Suriname 
Tanzania 
Uganda 
Zimbabwe 
 
 
In contrast to the EU, some other major importers (e.g. USA and Japan), have food safety 
import regulations which are generally enforced at a company rather than country level so a 
restriction on imports will only affect one particular exporter.  
 
EU legislation for all food products has been brought under one directive covering all aspects 
of the supply chain from ‘farm to fork’. In 2005 the EU General Food Law (178/2002) 
introduced a harmonised framework for food safety assurance from farm to the consumer 
across the 25 EU members. This legislation supersedes the individual commodity-based 
directives. All the steps in the chain from primary producers (fishermen and aquaculture 
units) to final retailer/supplier have to take on board, the principles of Hazard Analysis Critical 
Control Point (HACCP) systems and other quality assurance. This will broaden the scope of 
the competent authority in regulating the industry.  
 
The need to ensure that quality assurance measures are instituted prior to arrival at the 
processing factory gate poses a major challenge to export industries, particularly for the 
small-scale and non-industrialised sectors of the industry in ACP and other countries. Of 
even greater concern is that in order for the 'farm to fork' principle to be seen to be working a 
system of traceability of products throughout the chain will need to be instituted. Thus each 
person in the chain needs to be able to demonstrate that they know where the product has 
come from and where it has gone. This is now happening in horticultural produce where a 
detailed paper trail has to be established to achieve compliance – e.g. UK supermarkets 
selling green beans from Kenya know exactly who produced the beans and all the stages in 
the supply chain for those particular beans. 
 
If this is enforced for fisheries major problems can be forseen; e.g. small quantities of product 
from traditional fishermen are consolidated into larger batches by purchasers at landing 
points leading to mixing of batches which means that particular raw material supplies cannot 
be traced back to source. The knock-on effects that this might have on poor producers have 
yet to be ascertained.  
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Impact of EU Directives  
 
Even prior to the recent EU General Food laws, the strict EU food-safety regulations have 
caused serious difficulties for exporters of fishery products from ACP suppliers and other 
developing countries e.g. Bangladesh, China, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Tanzania, Thailand 
and Uganda have all had restrictions placed on their fish exports to the EU. One recent 
growing concern has been with regard to residual antibiotics in some products, especially 
shrimp. EU authorities have initiated a food-safety policy calling for ‘zero tolerance’ towards 
various antibiotics. However, there is no scientific evidence to show that a very low content of 
residue can be harmful to customer’s health. The issue of residual antibiotics in shrimp 
continues to be a cause for concern for exporting countries.  
 
Various country case studies have been undertaken which assess the impact of these SPS 
restrictions on various ACP fish exporting countries (see www.nri.org/projects/projects.htm, 
www.onefish.org/id/225570 and www.sia-trade.org). Case studies on the impact of fish 
export bans and the introduction of HACCP regulations in Bangladesh and Uganda are 
provided in Appendix 6. Enforcement of SPS measures has represented a major shock for 
export fisheries sectors for several ACP countries. In particular, in the short-term it can lead 
to loss of foreign exchange earnings, company bankruptcies and unemployment.  However, 
the impact of SBS/TBT measures is not always negative. These measures have had some 
positive impacts including improvements in fish quality management; improvements in the 
quality of products on the domestic market and enhanced export potential. In the medium to 
long-term, the sectors appear to be able to recover following a consolidation process leading 
to fewer but better equipped processing industries. Support from the EU to build capacity in 
HACCP, sanitary and hygiene measures and provide training could be a valuable way to 
help the ACP states integrate into the global economy, as foreseen in the 2004 Council 
Conclusions. Such support could be provided through or in addition to FPAs. 
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4 The Impact of EU Policies on Trade 
 
The EU is increasingly dependent on imports of fish and fishery products to meet the needs 
of its processing industry and consumer demand. Fish processing is particularly important for 
employment in some regions, especially Spain and France, often in regions where there are 
limited other employment opportunities. As a result, the EU has an interest in maintaining 
employment on its fleets and protecting its processing sector from cheap imports of 
processed fish, whilst maintaining access for raw and semi-processed material to support its 
processing industry. These issues lie behind the EU’s tariff peaks for certain processed 
fishery products, its Rules of Origin for imports from ACP countries, and its fisheries 
agreements with ACP countries. 
 
This section investigates the main fish and fishery products traded with Europe, their sources 
and destinations, and explores the impact of EU policies on fisheries trade in relation to its 
place in international trade in fish and fishery products, and whether the EU has created 
trade distortions. 
 
4.1 Supply lines of key fisheries products into EU 
 
This section outlines the supply lines of some key fisheries products into the EU. These are 
based on imports according to Globefish market reports and Eurostat data. Given the 
importance of tuna for ACP countries, the focus is on this product and its major markets in 
the EU: Spain, United Kingdom, France, Italy and Germany. In addition, other major fisheries 
products such as shrimp and whitefish (e.g. hake) are also analysed. Appendix 5 contains full 
details of EU imports and price data for these products.  
 
4.1.1 Tuna 
ACP countries provide a large proportion of tuna imports to the EU in fresh and frozen whole, 
loins and canned forms (Table 11). Seychelles, Mauritius, Cote d’Ivoire, Madagascar, Ghana 
and Papua New Guinea are the main ACP exporters of canned tuna to the EU. Kenya and 
Ghana also export tuna loins to the EU. Tuna loins and fresh and frozen whole tuna are 
imported mainly by Spain, France and Italy to supply their processing sectors with raw 
material for canning. 
 
However, despite the tariff preferences that ACP countries enjoy, particularly for canned tuna 
and loins, non-ACP countries represent a significant share of EU imports. Thailand, 
Philippines, Colombia, Ecuador and Indonesia are all important exporters of canned tuna to 
the EU. Tuna loins are also exported to the EU from Ecuador, Colombia, Thailand, El 
Salvador and Guatemala.  
 
In some cases, imports to the EU from non-ACP countries represent the reduced tariff quota 
given to some producers, although in the case of Germany, over half of canned tuna imports 
originate from countries with the highest duty.  
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Table 11: Supply lines of tuna products into the EU 
EU Markets / Products Main sources Remarks 
Spain 
Fresh and frozen whole: 
(159,000 tonnes imported in 
2005) 
Loins: 
(36,000 tonnes imported in 
2005) 
 
Seychelles, Panama, France, 
Guatemala, Ghana 
 
El Salvador, Ecuador, 
Guatemala 
A good share of imports includes 
transhipment from Spanish vessels 
(Globefish, October 2006). Quantities 
exported by source show substantial 
fluctuations.   
The importance of tuna loin imports is 
growing. 
United Kingdom 
Canned tuna: 
(133,000 tonnes imported in 
2005, equivalent to approx. 
309,000 tonnes whole tuna11) 
 
Seychelles, Mauritius, 
Thailand, Philippines 
Part of the supplies appear to be 
imported as part of the tariff quota for 
SE Asian producers. 
France 
Canned tuna: 
(108,000 tonnes imported in 
2005) 
 
Loins: 
(10,000 tonnes imported in 
2005) 
 
Cote d’Ivoire, Spain, 
Madagascar, Seychelles, 
Italy 
 
Italy, Ecuador, Thailand, 
Ghana  
 
 
Supplies from Cote d’Ivoire have 
declined as a result of unstable 
political situation there. 
 
Thai loin exports to the EU seem to 
stop once the tariff quota is used up. 
Italy 
Canned tuna: 
(72,000 tonnes imported in 
2005) 
 
Loins: 
(41,000 tonnes imported in 
2005) 
 
Spain (about 50%); Cote 
d’Ivoire, Colombia, 
Seychelles, France 
 
Ecuador, Colombia, Kenya 
 
Italian – Spanish joint ventures are 
important in the market (Globefish, 
Sept. 2006). 
 
Growing importance of tuna loin 
imports for processing. 
Germany 
Canned tuna: 
(84,000 tonnes imported in 
2005) 
 
 
Philippines, Thailand, 
Ecuador, Papua NG, 
Indonesia, Seychelles, 
France 
Apparently, 24% duty is less 
important than thought. Over half of 
German imports originate from 
countries with highest duty (Globefish, 
Sept. 2006) 
NB: Main sources reflect countries of origin in declining order (see Appendices for details) 
 
4.1.2 Shrimp 
Overall, the bulk of EU shrimp imports comes from non-ACP suppliers such as Greenland, 
Ecuador, Brazil, India, China, Bangladesh, Canada and Indonesia (Table 12).  
 
ACP countries such as Madagascar and Mozambique play a relatively minor role, each one 
supplying about 10,000 tonnes to the EU in 2005 (Appendix 5), although this represents an 
important source of foreign currency earnings for them, contributing 14.3% of total exports by 
value in the case of Mozambique (FAO 1999, 2002).  
 
This shows that ACP countries have not been able to establish a share in the EU shrimp 
market similar to the one they were able to achieve in the tuna market. Reasons for this 
include competition from a range of suppliers including coldwater shrimp producers, and 
aquaculture supplies from Asia and Latin America, plus preferential access arrangements to 
the EU market for several of these suppliers. 
 
                                                
11 Based on a conversion factor of 2.33, i.e. from each 100kg of whole fish, utilisation of light meat for 
canning is between 40 % and 46 % of its weight. Source: International Dolphin Conservation Program 
(2004). 
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Table 12: Supply lines of shrimp into the EU 
EU Markets / Products Main sources Remarks 
 
Spain 
156,000 tonnes imported in 
2005 
 
 
China, Brazil, Ecuador, 
Colombia, Argentina 
 
China has become major supplier 
following the easing of EU 
restrictions on Chinese shrimp 
imports (Globefish, February 2006) 
 
 
United Kingdom 
 
 
Iceland, India, Bangladesh, 
Ecuador 
UK market is traditionally oriented 
towards coldwater shrimp suppliers 
in northern Europe and warmwater 
shrimp supplies from Asia 
(Globefish, Jan. 2006). 
 
 
France 
 
 
Brazil, Madagascar, Ecuador, 
Netherlands,  
 
Increased imports from Ecuador, 
and falling supplies from 
Madagascar in 2005. 
 
Italy 
 
 
Ecuador, Denmark, India, 
Spain 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1.3 Whitefish 
Table 13 provides an example of a whitefish supply line (i.e. frozen whole / headed and 
gutted (H&G) hake). Spain has been given as an example because it is the EU’s principal 
importer of hake. Total Spanish hake imports were of the order of 160,000 tonnes in 2005, 
down by 14 % compared to 2004 (Globefish, Hake market report, March 2006). 
 
Nile perch is another major fisheries export from ACP countries. Both Tanzania and Uganda 
exported about 24,000 tonnes each to the EU in 2005, worth approximately € 90 million and 
€ 101 million, respectively (Globefish, 2006).  Kenya exports smaller quantities of Nile perch 
to the EU (e.g. 5,200 tonnes in 2005). 
 
Table 13: Supply lines of hake into the EU 
EU Markets / Products Main sources Remarks 
 
Spain 
e.g. Frozen whole / H&G 
hake imports (38,000 tonnes 
in 2005) 
 
Namibia, Argentina, South 
Africa, Chile 
 
Due to declining supplies, Spanish 
frozen hake imports have declined 
from 52,000 tonnes in 2004 to 
38,000 tonnes in 2005. 
 
Source: Globefish, Hake market report, March 2006 
 
 
4.2 The EU’s place in international fisheries trade 
4.2.1 Does the EU capture a disproportionate amount of international trade? 
 
As indicated in Figure 2, if considered as a group the EU represents the world’s principal 
importer and exporter of fisheries products. For example, EU-25 countries accounted for 
39 % of global fisheries imports and 25 % of exports by value in 2004 (Table 3). However, 
when analysed individually, the EU countries figure well behind Japan and the USA. The 
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EU’s main importers include Spain, France, Italy, UK and Germany, whilst Denmark, Spain, 
Netherlands, and UK are the principal exporters.  
 
When considering trade figures, the EU is not directly comparable to other major importers 
and exporters such as Japan and the USA, as it consists of 25 individual countries (now 27 
countries, since 1 January 2007) and a significant amount of trade occurs between these 
individual countries. This substantial intra-EU trade is usually implicit in global fisheries trade 
figures. Intra-EU trade of fisheries products were of the order of US$ 9.9 billion (€11.1 billion) 
and US$ 15.4 billion (€12.4 billion) per annum between 2001 and 2005 (Table 14). For 
example, in 2004 intra-EU trade in fish, crustacean, and molluscs was valued at 
US$ 14.5 billion (€ 11.7 billion).  
 
If the EU-25 are taken as a block and intra-EU trade discounted from trade figures, global 
trade in fishery products would have been of the order of US$ 56.98 billion rather than 
US$ 71.51 billion. Taking the lower global trade figure as the baseline, extra-EU exports 
would have accounted for only 4.7 % of global trade, whilst extra-EU imports would have 
represented 26.9 % of global trade in fisheries products in 2004.  
 
When one takes into consideration that the EU population consumes a large amount of fish 
(on average, 24 kg per person per year), and that the total population of the EU-25 is 
458 million, these figures for extra-EU imports and exports are not excessive. Indeed, they 
are comparable to other major fish-consuming nations, such as the USA. When one 
considers the percentage of the value of world fishery trade (imports and exports) that the 
EU captures, compared to the percentage of the world’s population that it represents, extra-
EU trade is relatively smaller than USA and Korean trade in fish and fisheries products 
(Table 15). When intra-EU trade is included, the figures are predictably higher, but not 
excessively so. 
 
 
Table 14: Trends in EU-25 Trade in Fish, Crustaceans and Molluscs (US$ billion) 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Value of extra-EU exports 1.883 2.068 2.406 2.678 2.841 
Value of extra-EU imports 11.503 11.746 13.957 15.056 17.021 
Value of intra-EU trade 9.947 10.530 12.700 14.527 15.462 
Value of world trade   63.686 71.508  
Value of world trade discounting 
intra-EU trade   50.986 56.981  
Source: Eurostat (2006) External and Intra-European Union Trade, Statistical Yearbook Data 1958 – 2005, 
Edition 2006, European Commission, Luxembourg. 
Data supplied in €; Exchange rates used are the average for the year from www.oanda.com. EUR to USD 
(Interbank rate) 2001: 0.89658; 2002: 0.94590; 2003: 1.13208; 2004: 1.24386; 2005: 1.24539. 
N.b: Intra-EU trade is described as exports / dispatches in Eurostat (2006). 
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Table 15 Fish imports and exports compared to population size and fish consumption 
Imports Exports 
 
Population 
in 2004 
(millions) 
Fish 
supply 
(kg/ 
person/  
year) 
$ billion
% of 
world 
imports
$ billion
% of 
world 
exports
% of world 
population
% world 
imports /  
% world 
population 
% world 
exports / 
% world 
population 
Spain 42.646 47.5 5.222 6.9 2.565 3.6 0.66 10.52 5.47
France 60.257 31.3 4.176 5.5 1.526 2.1 0.93 5.93 2.30
UK 59.479 23.2 2.812 3.7 1.812 2.5 0.92 4.04 2.77
Netherlands 16.226 24.5 1.837 2.4 2.452 3.4 0.25 9.61 13.74
EU 
(intra+extra) 458.194 24.3 29.193 38.8 17.73 24.8 7.05 5.50 3.52
EU (extra) 458.194 -- 15.029 20 2.673 3.7 7.05 2.84 0.53
          
USA 295.410 21.3 11.967 15.9 3.851 5.4 4.54 3.50 1.18
Japan 127.923 66.3 14.56 19.3 1.077 1.5 1.97 9.81 0.77
China 1,307.989 25.6 3.126 4.2 1.801 2.5 20.12 0.21 0.13
Thailand 63.694 30.9 1.231 1.6 4.034 5.6 0.98 1.67 5.76
Korea, Rep 47.645 58.7 2.233 3.0 1.139 1.6 0.73 4.05 2.17
Iceland 0,292 91.0 0.100 0.1 1.770 2.5 0.00 29.66 551.00
 
 
 
Is the EU the most efficient processor of fisheries products? 
 
Some EU countries, in particular France and Spain, import raw or semi-processed material to 
supply their processing industries, in particular the tuna canning industry. Table 16 presents 
the costs of production of canned tuna in the European Union (Spain and Italy), Thailand, 
and an ACP country (Seychelles), indicating the efficiency of processing industries in the 
respective countries. The results demonstrate that Thai production costs are lowest, in 
particular if low-value products such as skipjack in brine are taken into account. As for yellow 
fin tuna in vegetable oil, Spanish and Seychelles’ processing costs are 17.8 % and 12.6 % 
higher, respectively, compared to Thailand. This suggests that Thailand is a more ‘efficient’ 
processor than the EU or ACP countries considered in the table. In particular, this is due to 
their lower labour costs.  
 
 
Table 16 Cost of production of a case of canned tuna in different countries 
Country Product Cost (€/case) 
Spain Yellow fin in veg oil 27.1 
Italy Yellow fin in olive oil 35.7 
Seychelles Yellow fin in veg oil 25.9 
Thailand Yellow fin in veg oil 23.0 
Thailand Skipjack in brine 17.3 
Source: NAP Fisheries and NRI (2006) 
 
Whilst the EU is not the most efficient processor of fisheries products, its established 
infrastructure provides it with a comparative advantage in relation to countries that do not yet 
have a processing industry. At the same time, EU processing industries are struggling to 
compete with competitors from developing countries, some of which have preferential market 
access arrangements with the EU as outlined above. For example, according to the 
Globefish tuna market report for the EU (October 2006), ‘the long term decline in French tuna 
imports, to be used as raw material for tuna canneries, is in line with the gradual closure of 
canning factories’. As a result, the few remaining French canneries are focussing on high-
quality products at the upper end of the market. Italy underwent a similar process. As for 
Spain, according to Globefish (October 2006), ‘the traditional and high quality tuna canneries 
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in Spain have been resisting the use of tuna loins for processing for years. But now also this 
industry has to obey the rules of the market, where labour cost reduction is the main theme 
... Spanish companies are opening up factories in Central American or Andean Community 
countries, to produce tuna loins, but also canned tuna, for the Spanish market’. This has 
implications for jobs in regions where the Spanish tuna processing industry is located (e.g. 
Galicia). 
 
 
4.3 Has the EU created distortions in international trade in fish and 
fisheries products? 
4.3.1 Impacts of ACP preferential access to EU markets 
 
The EU’s trade policies actively increase the dependency of ACP countries on the EU, both 
as a trade partner as well as a fishing partner. The tariff preference that ACP states enjoy 
has resulted in them relying on the EU market for a large proportion of their exports (see 
Section 4.3.1). Furthermore, because most ACP states do not have sufficient domestic 
fisheries harvesting capacity, the EU’s RoO also increase their reliance on the presence of 
EU fishing vessels in their waters to provide originating tuna for their processing factories. 
This provides the EU with an extra ‘bargaining chip’ when negotiating FPAs. 
 
The EU RoO provide an advantage to EU capital in the form of fishing vessels or processing 
plants, and a disadvantage to third-country capital (Lem, 2005). Not only does it put third-
country supplies of raw-material for processing in ACP countries at a disadvantage, it also 
precludes third-country capital from setting up capacity in ACP countries for exports to the 
EU. The current RoO may in some cases act as an incentive for coastal states to sign a 
fisheries agreement with the EU, in order to gain access to ‘originating’ tuna for their 
processing plants. As a result, the RoO have an influence on the EU’s fisheries policy, 
reinforcing the presence of the EU distant water fleet in the waters of ACP countries. 
 
Table 17 highlights the significance of the EU market for ACP countries. Whilst, as a group, 
the ACP are the second largest supplier of unprocessed fish to the EU (after Norway), ACP 
countries also have a dominant position in the supply of processed products. In particular, 
this is the result of preferential market access for ‘sensitive’ products such as canned tuna 
where ACP suppliers have a margin of preference of 24 %. This has the double-effect of 
providing preferential access for ACP countries whilst protecting European fish processing 
industries. Trade data demonstrate that the ACP countries that export significant quantities of 
processed fish to the EU are those countries that have tuna canning factories, demonstrating 
the importance of this product for their economies (Appendix 5 and Table 20).  
 
Preferential market access through tariff based protection and elaborate Rules of Origin 
(RoO) have trade distorting effects in that potentially more efficient competitors are priced out 
of the market (also see Section 5.2). Nevertheless, ACP preferences are already being 
eroded as a consequence of other preferential market access arrangement as part of the 
EU’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), e.g. Everything but Arms initiative (EBA), 
GSP+12, standard GSP including special arrangements for tsunami affected countries, and 
tariff quotas (Section 3.2.2).   
                                                
12 As part of GSP+, the following developing countries benefit from the special incentive arrangement 
for sustainable development and good governance provided for in Regulation (EC) No 980/2005 from 
1 January 2006 – 31 December 2008:  Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Georgia, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Sri Lanka, Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, El Salvador, and 
Venezuela.  
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Table 17: Fish imports into the EU, 2003 (percentage, by value) 
  
     Origin 
Unprocessed 
fish 
Processed 
fish 
Total EU fish 
imports 
ACP countries 12% 33% 15% 
Norway 17%   15% 
Iceland 7%   6% 
Morocco 4% 11% 5% 
Argentina 6%   5% 
USA 4% 4% 4% 
China 4%   3% 
Faroe Isles 4%   3% 
Russia 4%   3% 
Thailand   9%   
Ecuador   11%   
Colombia   4%   
Philippines   4%   
Other 38% 24% 41% 
ACP value (€ billion) 1.21 0.53 1.74 
Total value (€ billion) 9.87 1.6 11.47 
Source: Mackie, 2004   
Exchange rate (2003): 0.886 € per US$  
 
 
As highlighted in Table 18, Namibia, Senegal, Tanzania and Mauritania are the principal 
ACP suppliers of unprocessed fish into the EU, whilst Seychelles, Ivory Coast, Ghana, and 
Mauritius are the main suppliers of processed fish (i.e. predominantly canned tuna). Details 
of fisheries trade between the EU and individual ACP countries for the 2003–2005 period are 
contained in Appendix 5. 
 
Table 18: EU fish imports from ACP countries, 2003 (percentage, by value) 
  
  
Unprocessed 
fish 
Processed 
fish 
Namibia 30%   
Senegal 13% 4% 
Tanzania 10%   
Mauritania 9%   
Seychelles 8% 27% 
Uganda 5%   
Ghana 4% 15% 
Madagascar 4% 11% 
Mozambique 2%   
Kenya 2% 1% 
Guinea 2%   
Nigeria 2%   
Ivory Coast 1% 21% 
Togo 1%   
Papua New Guinea   6% 
Mauritius   14% 
Other   1% 
Total value (bn €) 1.21 0.53 
Source: Mackie, 2004  
Exchange rate (2003), 0.886 € per US$ 
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Canned and processed tuna products represent the main supply of fisheries products from 
ACP countries to the EU (Lem, 2005). This is followed by fish fillets, shrimp, chilled whole 
and frozen whole fish, and octopus (Table 19). 
 
Yellowfin and skipjack tuna, which are the predominant species used for canning, are the 
main species imported by ACP countries from the EU. This ‘import’ is usually in the form of 
landings from EU vessels in those countries. Other species imported by ACP countries 
include herring and mackerel, in particular by West African countries. Net exports by ACP 
countries to the EU were of the order of US$ 1.8 billion in 2002 (Lem, 2005). 
 
 
Table 19: Summary of ACP – EU fisheries trade, 2002 
ACP exports (USD 2.1 billion) ACP imports (US$ 315 million) 
 
Canned/processed tuna (US$ 531 m; 25 %) 
Fish fillets (US$ 409 million; 20 %) 
Shrimp (US$ 355 million; 17 %) 
Fish chilled, whole (US$ 159 m; 8 %)  
Fish frozen, whole (US$ 109 m; 5 %) 
Octopus (US$ 102 million; 5 %)  
 
 
Yellow fin tuna (US$ 57 million; 18 %) 
Skipjack tuna (US$ 53 million; 17 %) 
Herring (US$ 51 million; 16 %) 
Mackerel (US$ 46 million; 15 %)  
 
Source: Lem, 2005 
 
 
4.3.2 Impacts of FPAs on fisheries trade 
 
Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPAs), the bilateral agreements that allow EU vessels to 
fish in the waters of other countries, can have an influence on fisheries trade flows in several 
ways. By allowing EU vessels to catch fish in other countries’ EEZs, they increase the 
amount of fish directly available to the EU. However, whether FPAs increase or decrease 
fisheries trade depends primarily on whether EU vessels land fish locally (in the coastal 
state) or not.  
 
Where EU vessels land fish caught under FPAs directly into EU ports, FPAs have the effect 
of reducing the amount of international fish trade; if FPAs did not exist and the EU had to 
import fish to supply its processing factories and consumers, there would be more fish trade 
between the EU and those countries, presuming that the fishing capacity to catch those fish 
were available to the third country.  
 
On the other hand, FPAs increase fish exports from the EU to coastal states in those cases 
where EU vessels land the fish in-country for local processing. For example, the fish caught 
by an EU vessel fishing in Seychelles’ EEZ would be of EU ‘nationality’. Therefore when 
those fish are landed in Seychelles for processing, they are ‘exported’ from the EU and 
imported into Seychelles. This inflates apparent exports from the EU to those coastal states. 
If the coastal state had sufficient harvesting capacity to catch those fish themselves, the fish 
would not need to be ‘exported’ from the EU to then be processed. Table 1Table 20 shows 
trade figures for fresh/frozen and canned tuna between the EU and Indian Ocean countries. 
The countries with both a fisheries agreement with the EU as well as processing capacity 
(Seychelles and Mauritius) receive substantial exports of fresh and frozen tuna from the EU, 
usually from EU vessels operating in their waters, in other EEZs in the region or in High Seas 
areas. 
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Table 20 EU exports and imports of fresh/frozen tuna and canned tuna to and from Indian 
Ocean countries (in tonnes) 
 Exports Imports 
 
FPA Processing factories Fresh/frozen Canned Fresh/frozen Canned 
Comoros 9 8 – – – – 
Mauritius 9 9 24,774 8 57 33,881 
Maldives 8 9 – – 225 6,920 
Reunion 8 8 – – – – 
Seychelles 9 9 72,855 – 42,180 54,409 
Mayotte 8 8 – 3 – – 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Where they land in-country, EU vessels fishing under FPAs (as well as EU vessels fishing 
under private arrangements) provide a source of ‘originating’ fish (see section 3.2.4 on Rules 
of Origin) for the local processing sector where this exists (e.g. Seychelles, Cote d’Ivoire), 
and the products therefore qualify for export to the EU at 0 % tariff. This can support ACP 
countries’ trade in fish and fish products under the current Rules of Origin.  
 
Table 21 illustrates the quantities of fish obtained from FPAs compared to the gross and net 
imports of fish from the same countries. The fish from African FPAs represents almost half of 
the net fish imports from those countries, and in the Indian Ocean the proportion is greater, 
63 %. In the Indian Ocean this is partly because net fish imports are relatively low 
(40,692 tonnes) as there are substantial exports of frozen tuna from EU vessels to 
processing plants in Mauritius (24,774 tonnes of exports from EU) and Seychelles 
(72,855 tonnes of exports from the EU). Therefore, part of the 69,000 tonnes of tuna caught 
under FPAs in the region is also represented in the total imports from the region, as canned 
tuna. The influence of FPAs in the Pacific region is minimal, as in 2004 only one FPA was 
operational (Kiribati).  
 
Fish from FPAs represent a relatively large proportion of net fish imports from African FPA 
countries, because net imports are depressed by relatively large exports of fish from the EU 
to some African countries, in particular of small pelagic species to provide a low-cost protein 
source for the population. In contrast, the species exported, and caught under FPAs, are 
typically higher value species such as tuna, shrimp, whitefish and cephalopods. 
 
In addition to the fish that is caught and landed directly in the EU, the EU imports relatively 
high value fish from FPA countries, such as shrimp, whitefish and octopus, as well as fresh 
and frozen tuna to supply the processing industry. The tuna comes predominantly from the 
Indian Ocean countries particularly Seychelles, but fresh and frozen yellowfin is also 
imported from Senegal, as well as frozen yellowfin from Cote d’Ivoire. 
 
 
Table 21 Fish imports to EU from FPA countries, by region (2004) 
 Africa Indian Ocean Pacific 
Fish imports from FPA countries (tonnes) 182,320.4 138,644.1 0.0
Net fish imports from FPA countries (tonnes) 77,153.6 40,691.5 0.0
Fish from FPAs (tonnes) 73,017.1 68,775.3 624.0
Total fish from FPA countries (net, in tonnes)  150,170.7 109,466.8 624.0
Fish from FPAs as % of net total 48.6 62.8 100.0
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5 The Evolving Trade Context and Potential Impact 
 
The context in which trade in fish and fisheries products takes place is evolving, due to two 
main factors: 
• The negotiation of EPAs with ACP countries, to bring EU-ACP trading arrangements in 
line with WTO rules; 
• WTO negotiations on tariffs, which are likely to lead to a reduction in tariffs and 
subsequent preference erosion for those countries currently enjoying 0 % tariff access 
to the EU market; 
• WTO negotiations on fisheries subsidies, which may lead to greater regulation and 
restrictions of government financial transfers to the sector. 
 
5.1 Potential impacts of EPAs on fisheries trade 
 
Table 22 and Table 23 show the EU fisheries trade with ACP countries by EPA region. 
ECOWAS (to which Mauritania has been added), ESA, and SADC each account for 
substantial fisheries supplies to the EU. CARIFORUM, CEMAC, and Pacific Forum play a 
lesser role, although in the latter case fisheries play an increasingly important role in the 
negotiations. 
 
Details of fisheries trade between the EU and individual ACP countries are contained in 
Appendix 5. 
 
 
Table 22 EU fisheries imports from ACP countries by EPA region (’000 Euros) 
Unprocessed fisheries products Processed fisheries products Origin 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 
CARIFORUM 56,405 52,393 62,822 5 742 1,216
CEMAC 20,801 22,721 23,246 - - -
ECOWAS + Mauritania 430,600 277,121 371,576 218,618 207,154 169,265
ESA 269,097 292,627 298,814 286,219 280,027 296,052
PACIFIC FORUM 1,874 1,066 2,714 24,021 29,442 45,924
SADC 444,347 417,592 428,436 1,255 3,280 6,450
Total 1,223,124 1,163,520 1,187,608 530,118 520,645 518,907
Source: Eurostat - http://fd.comext.eurostat.cec.eu.int/xtweb/ 
Dataset: DS-016890 - EU25 Trade since 1995 by CN8 
Unprocessed products: CN Code 03, Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates 
Processed fisheries products: CN Codes 16041100 - 16059090 
 
 
Table 23 EU fisheries exports to ACP countries by EPA region (in ’000 Euros) 
Unprocessed fisheries products Processed fisheries products Origin 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 
CARIFORUM 13,812 5,306 3,605 3,729 1,729 2,531
CEMAC 3,549 2,639 1,794 639 488 614
ECOWAS + Mauritania 228,651 188,565 180,325 1,033 1,247 890
ESA 90,582 96,833 103,266 665 499 1,046
PACIFIC FORUM 122 2 - 91 55 1
SADC 3,782 5,548 7,747 2,512 2,536 2,582
Total 340,598 298,893 296,737 8,669 6,554 7,664
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The key issues for ACP countries regarding EPAs and fisheries are: 
 
• How EPAs will affect fisheries trade flows; 
• Whether and how Rules of Origin may be relaxed; 
• How bilateral FPAs and regional EPAs may complement or conflict with each other. 
 
 
5.1.1 EPAs and fisheries trade flows 
The way in which EPAs may affect trade flows between the EU and ACP countries and 
cross-border trade within ACP regions depends on the current tariff structures and how these 
are affected by EPAs.  
 
To be consistent with WTO Article XXIV, the EPAs are to be based on the principle of 
reciprocity in ‘substantially all trade’, which is widely understood to be of the order of 90 % of 
the current EU – ACP trade flows (Hinkle et al, 2006). The transition has to take place within 
a ‘reasonable length of time’, which is interpreted to be 10 years. While the EU plans for a 
maximum of asymmetry and flexibility in the implementation of the EPAs (especially 
regarding the product coverage and duration of the transitional periods), any asymmetry or 
non-reciprocity is only permissible during the phase-in period (Pozzi et al, 2005). 
 
This means that ACP countries will have to open up their markets to imports from the EU and 
other ACP countries, except for a basket of strategic commodities, which may or may not 
include fisheries products. Appendix 2 shows the fisheries tariff structure for some selected 
ACP countries, based on Melchior (2005). Countries that currently apply high tariffs on 
fisheries imports and which would have to reduce tariffs as a result of EPA membership, are 
likely to be affected as a result of potentially higher fisheries imports from the EU, and loss of 
duty revenue (if they currently import substantial quantities).  
 
Stevens (2006) points out that EPAs could strengthen regional integration but also weaken it 
in that there is a danger for regionalism (e.g. existing groups may splinter, or as EPAs are 
implemented they may provide new reasons not to remove intra-regional border controls), 
and EPAs can provoke regional realignments (e.g. parties to the SADC Trade Protocol have 
split into two groups). Also, the three EAC states are split between the SADC and ESA 
negotiating groups — Tanzania is a member of both but has decided to negotiate the EPA 
with the SADC group. 
 
5.1.2 Rules of Origin 
 
A key concern of ACP states is how the Rules of Origin can be relaxed to the benefit of 
ACP countries, allowing them more flexibility to obtain raw material from non-ACP/EU 
sources, and lower production costs. 
 
There are three main options (Campling, 2006): 
 
Relaxation of existing fisheries RoO: In addition to general RoO reforms, the EC 
Taxation and Customs Union Directorate-General (TaxUD) has suggested three 
areas for probable reform of fisheries specific RoO. Amongst other things, the EC 
proposal includes deletion of the crew condition; simplification and clarification of the 
ownership condition, and simplification of the ‘wholly obtained’ criteria.  
 
Value-added method: DG Taxud is in favour of the value-added criterion across the 
board for GSP and EPA RoO. The initial proposal is that an item would require 40 % 
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value to be added within the contracting country for it to qualify for originating status 
and therefore preferential access. 
 
Change in tariff sub-heading (CTSH) method: Substantial transformation is defined 
as a tariff change of heading at a six digit level. However, when a tariff heading 
change only results in the product’s transformation from fresh to frozen, such fish 
would not be treated as originating fish. 
 
As for their impacts, RoO lead to increased production costs (e.g. limited supply of raw 
material, administrative burden). They are modelled to be of the order of 5 % on average for 
EU imports originating in ACP countries. For some products the costs may be as high as 
16 % (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2006). 
 
More relaxed RoO are expected to lead to a reduction in costs for exported goods and 
increased exports from ACP countries to the EU. A sustainability impact assessment of the 
EU–ACP Economic Partnership Agreements – Rules of Origin in the SADC Group was 
carried out by PriceWaterhouse Coopers (2006, P61-63). This study assumed the reduction 
in costs to be 5 % in a standard case, and 10 % in a higher case scenario. The simulation 
analysis carried out showed that cost reductions are likely to lead to increased fisheries 
exports from the SADC countries to the EU. The highest export increases to the EU are likely 
to occur in Angola (up to 19 % increase of exports in the case of a 10 % cost reduction). At 
the same time, Angola represents a different case in that it exports less in the current 
situation and is less dependent on the EU market. As a result, the shift would primarily be the 
result of trade being redirected; total Angolan exports would only increase marginally. 
 
Exports may also increase in the other three SADC countries with significant marine fisheries 
(i.e. Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania), especially if a 10 % cost reduction can be achieved. 
Unprocessed fish export increases to the EU can be expected to be of the order of 1–2 % in 
the case of a 5 % production cost reduction, and 6–10 % if costs are reduced by 10 %. 
Overall exports (i.e. to EU and elsewhere) would only really go up (i.e. by 3–4 %) if 
production costs can be substantially reduced (e.g. 10 % cost saving). 
 
In the case of processed fish, only Namibia and Mozambique would benefit from better 
access to EU markets, as they are the only ones that currently export any real amounts of 
processed fishery products to the EU. Export increases to the EU are expected to be in the 
range 5.6 % to 10.9 % for Namibia, and 3.9 % to 9.6 % for Mozambique, depending on the 
decrease in production costs as a result of relaxed RoO. 
 
Brenton (2006) argues that depending on the level at which the value-added requirement is 
set, RoO would either be less or more restrictive:  
 
By reforming the rules of origin for LDCs to provide a value-added requirement of no 
more than 10 percent across all products in the EBA (with the alternative of satisfying 
either the value-added rule or a change of tariff heading requirement), the European 
Union would widen access to its market in a manner consistent with the Doha 
process and with the on-going adjustment to the expiration of quotas on textile and 
clothing products.  …. A low value-added requirement (10 percent) common across 
all products would be more transparent, simpler for firms to satisfy, and easier to 
administer by customs and other agencies. Setting a high value-added requirement 
(such as 40–50 percent) and allowing limited regional cumulation is most unlikely to 
provide for substantial easing of the rules of origin. It could even make them more 
restrictive.  
 
In comparison, ODI (2006) argued that a ‘major challenge is to avoid either enormous 
complexity of thresholds that are too high for some but too low for others. If this hurdle is 
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overcome and the Commission suggests value added thresholds of around 25 % or less in 
many sectors, they could well be development friendly. If they are 35 % or more, they are 
probably unfriendly. And countries exporting under the GSP or Cotonou have reason for 
great caution.’ 
 
 
5.1.3 Coherence between bilateral FPAs and regional EPAs 
 
It is still not clear how FPAs and EPAs will complement or combine with each other. The 
Pacific and Eastern and Southern Africa regions are keen to negotiate fisheries 
arrangements at a regional level with the EU, but have not been successful in their requests. 
Pacific Island Countries have agreed a Multilateral Fisheries Partnership Agreement (MFPA) 
to negotiate with the European Union as part of the regions Economic Partnership 
Agreement. The same press statement (14/11/06) further states that the proposed MFPA will 
not affect the bilateral fisheries agreements that three of the Pacific ACP states, namely 
Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati and Solomon Islands already have with the EU13. In 
fact, the MFPA is expected to deliver benefits over and above those contained in the bilateral 
fisheries agreements. 
 
There are a number of arguments to keep fisheries access separate from EPAs:  
 
• FPAs are related only to access to the fishery and is not directly related to trade 
relationships – these are not overtly negotiated in the agreements;  
• By including fisheries access in EPAs, it may be traded off against other EPA issues – 
leaving ACP states in a weaker position;  
• FPAs are not compatible with EPAs as they cannot be arranged on the same regional 
groupings as the EPAs;  
• EU does not accept regional FPAs although some countries would prefer such an 
approach; 
• Although ‘development objectives’ run through EPAs, these agreements are not the place 
to consider regional fisheries management objectives;  
• EPAs are not foreseen to include any funding for development initiatives.  
 
However there a number of aspects of where FPAs and EPAs are expected to have 
impacts on each other. These include:  
 
• The combination of the Rules of Origin (RoO) and the access of DWFs to ACP waters 
gives the EU a trade/marketing advantage in that:  
o The DWFs can land their catch within ACP ports at a higher price because the 
fish is considered ‘originating’;  
o The DWFs can land their catch into EU ports and have less competition from 
ACP processors as they have trouble with the RoO rules;  
o The DWFs have access to fisheries resources before ACP states can charter 
vessels and import the resulting catch into the EU; 
o The DWF can be considered to be receiving ‘subsidies’ in that they have to 
pay a lower licence fee and the negotiation costs for establishing the 
agreement are covered by the EU. This means that they can supply the EU 
market at a lower cost than other fleets.  
                                                
13 Trade and Fisheries Ministers conclude meeting, Press release, [Pacific Islands Forum] 14 Nov 
2006 
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• The SPS rules also reinforce this and give DWF a competitive advantage because a 
number of countries cannot import directly into EU as they have not passed the required 
standards.  
 
If fisheries is included as a separate chapter in EPAs a number of queries remain:  
 
• The Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) group is negotiating to maintain preferred tariffs 
for fisheries. The question is whether this is WTO compatible if the rest of the EPA covers 
‘substantially all trade’; 
• The question will also be whether the EU will agree to this within the negotiation and 
whether fisheries may be traded off against other issues, such as market access to the 
EU for other products. All the ESA states would have to agree to the importance of 
fisheries to maintain this as a priority; 
• The degree that fisheries policy and sectoral development are treated in EPAs is variable.  
 
 
5.2 Potential impacts of WTO Doha Round 
 
Fisheries gained prominence in the Doha Round negotiations due to the inclusion of a 
statement in the Declaration of the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference (Doha, 2001), 
stipulating that participants in the negotiations should aim to clarify and improve WTO 
disciplines on fisheries subsidies, taking into account the importance of this sector to 
developing countries. This was reiterated at the sixth WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong 
Kong (December 2005), calling for the prohibition of certain forms of fisheries subsidies that 
contribute to overcapacity and over-fishing. 
 
The Doha Round negotiations were suspended in July 2006 due to deadlock over issues 
such as agricultural subsidies. At the end of 2006, informal meetings of several of the WTO 
negotiating groups restarted (ICTSD, 2006) and full-scale negotiations resumed in early 
February, although confidence in the political will to conclude the negotiations is lacking 
(ICTSD, 2007).  
 
If the negotiations are brought to a successful conclusion they will have an impact on 
fisheries mainly through two areas: 
• Market access (i.e. tariff measures) as part of the negotiations on non-agricultural 
market access (NAMA). The EU favours tariff reductions based on a Swiss formula 
(Appendix 3) with flexibilities for developing countries. Non-tariff measures such as 
SPS and TBT, which also form part of NAMA, are unlikely to be affected. 
• Subsidies to the fisheries sector in different forms, which are being discussed by the 
WTO Negotiating Group on Rules. The EU position lies between the ‘top-down 
approach’ of the Friends of Fish group (e.g. New Zealand, Chile, Peru, USA) whereby 
all subsidies should be banned apart from specifically-defined cases, and the ‘bottom-
up approach’ by countries such as Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, whereby all subsidies 
should be allowed apart from specifially-defined cases. The EU approach (i.e. middle-
ground) is based on categorising subsidies into ‘boxes’ (i.e. red and green) whereby 
‘red’ subsidies contributing to overcapacity are prohibited (e.g. subsidies for vessel 
construction or renovation). 
 
Questions to be addressed as part of this study include an assessment of the impacts 
resulting from the reduction of the margin of preference to approximately 12 % by the EU (as 
a result of NAMA negotiations). In particular, the impacts are being assessed for both ACP 
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and EU countries that are currently major producers of processed fish (e.g. tuna), and which 
will be exposed to stronger competition from producers such as Thailand. 
 
Expanding on Table 16, Table 24 provides the cost of a case of canned tuna from Thailand 
under different levels of import duty. This indicates that EU and Seychelles suppliers would 
struggle to compete if EU import tariffs were reduced to 12 %. The figures explain the keen 
interest of EU and ACP suppliers of canned tuna that the 24 % EU duty rate is maintained. 
However, ACP tuna processors are also concerned that the Thai tuna fishing and canning 
sector may receive subsidies to enable it to operate at such low costs.  
 
 
Table 24 Comparative cost of production of canned tuna 
Country Product Total cost 
€/case 
Duty 
12% 
Duty 
18% 
Duty 
24% 
Spain Yellowfin in veg oil 27.1    
Italy Yellowfin in olive oil 35.7    
Seychelles Yellowfin in veg oil 25.9    
Thailand Yellowfin in veg oil 23.0 25.7 27.1 28.5 
Thailand Skipjack in brine 17.3 19.4 20.4 21.4 
Source: NAP Fisheries tuna processing model; in NAP Fisheries and NRI (2006) 
 
 
5.2.1 Potential impact of reduced margin of preference 
 
European Union 
 
The impact of a reduced margin of preference will be greatest where current rates are 
relatively high and for product areas of major importance in EU markets (e.g. tuna and 
shrimp) (Kleih et al., 2006). The key economic fundamental underlying competition from 
developing country suppliers is their lower labour costs.  
 
The impact of tariff reductions for the EU tuna industry would be quite serious for the 
industries in question. Spain (the main EU tuna canner) and to a lesser extent Italy, France, 
and Portugal are likely to lose out to low cost Asian canners for all but the highest quality 
speciality products. It is difficult to see how the Spanish processing industry could remain 
competitive in the mainstream market if tariffs were to be reduced by half. The outcome 
would probably be the Spanish industry following its French and Italian equivalents into a 
specialist high quality niche market that relies upon strong national brands and imported tuna 
loins to reduce production costs. Loss of a significant number of jobs may be the 
consequence.   
 
The main loser will be the processing sector, but there may also be potential knock-on 
effects for the EU tuna fleet due to the potential loss of the domestic market (and ACP 
canneries under threat from preference erosion). However, given that tuna trade very much 
resembles a global commodity market EU producers should be able to divert supplies to third 
country canners – they export to them now anyway. Also, shorter transport distances 
between fishing areas and some third country canneries could prove a benefit.  
 
In addition to tuna canning, small pelagic canning, whitefish processing and shrimp 
processing all seem likely to suffer. This will be exacerbated where low cost raw material 
(farmed shrimp, farmed or wild whitefish) is sourced from developing country regions, as 
there will be strong incentives to process where production takes place rather than in the EU. 
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Primary producers (ground fish and shrimp fishers) could also be disadvantaged as 
competition from imported cheap whitefish and shrimp will put downward pressure on prices 
at a time when quotas, low catch rates and high costs (e.g. fuel) are already jeopardising the 
industry. 
 
In sum, the effects seem likely to be felt most severely in the EU fish canning sector, and 
particularly in the tuna industry of the Mediterranean countries. Small pelagics canneries 
throughout the EU including the north (especially the Baltic region including Scandinavia, the 
Baltic States, Eastern Germany and Poland) will also be under threat. 
 
Shrimp processing would increasingly move to developing countries (an on-going process 
that is likely to be reinforced) with negative implications for processors in Northern Europe. 
The coldwater shrimp fishing industry will find already low prices dropping further. 
 
Traditional whitefish supplies may be increasingly supplanted by cheap farmed tropical 
alternatives, reducing prices for already pressed EU ground fish fleets. EU primary seafood 
processors will see the move to low cost areas accelerate. Expansion of foreign markets for 
small pelagics could help some northern fisheries. However, this will frustrate Eastern 
European hopes of developing a seafood processing sector as it becomes cheaper to 
relocate further east. Duties are low on most salmon products, so the impact will be muted, 
except perhaps for added value items (smoked) from Chile. 
 
There will be a general move within the EU fisheries sector to supply premium fresh products 
that are more immune to import competition. A reorientation of the EU small pelagic fisheries 
to exploit expanded markets (e.g. Russia, Turkey) and better prices in third countries is likely 
to take place. The overall impact will result in an even larger EU seafood trade deficit with the 
rest of the world. 
 
However, in contrast to the general picture of losses in production and processing, economic 
benefits are likely to accrue from tariff impacts to the retail and food service sub-sectors, as 
well as to the consumers, as a result of falling prices. At the same time, consumer benefits 
will depend on price reductions being passed on by the food service industry and retailers 
and not being captured by the latter (e.g. supermarket chains). 
 
Social impacts are generally linked to the economic outcomes already noted. Loss of 
livelihoods in fishing communities may be particularly significant since in some cases there 
may be few alternative options available. Moreover where processing as well as capture 
fishery are involved there may also be important gender implications (e.g. because of 
impacts on women’s employment in processing factories). Effects may also be concentrated 
in particular regions with wider knock on effects for local economies (e.g. in Galicia and the 
Basque coast in the case of tuna processing, or in Scotland in the case of smoked salmon).  
 
As for environmental impacts, in theory at least the growth of cheaper whitefish supplies from 
farmed fish in developing countries if coupled to strengthening of fisheries management 
systems and reductions in catch allowances for EU whitefish could enhance the potential for 
fish stock recovery in EU waters. The latter would apply to the lower value whitefish most 
affected by competition, (i.e. mainly gadoids such as cod and hake). However lower EU 
catch/production could have offsetting effects in developing countries if expanding cultured 
fish production and/or more intensive methods leads to environmental degradation. The 
extent of the latter will depend on the nature of management systems that are adopted and 
the efficacy of their implementation. As for environmental impacts, capture primarily depends 
on catch control. As a consequence, increased imports do not necessarily mean less 
pressure on domestic fish stocks in that catch size will be determined by quotas. 
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ACP/LDC countries 
 
A substantial reduction of tariffs on imports into the European Unionis likely to have the 
greatest negative impact on ACP/LDC countries that largely depend on preferential market 
access for their exports. This is due to preference erosion resulting in the loss of their 
competitive advantage, which in turn is expected to lead to lower profits as a consequence of 
declining prices and lower volumes traded. Increased competition will force fish processing 
plants to attempt to reduce costs through measures such as paying lower prices for raw 
material or laying off workers. There is a danger that some processing industries (e.g. tuna 
canneries) will collapse, threatening the viability of some transhipment centres. In addition, 
government revenues (e.g. tax income) will be reduced, and a drop in foreign exchange 
earnings may lead to greater exchange rate instability. The following outlines the potential 
impact of tariff reductions for different ACP and other developing countries. 
 
Ghana: If import tariffs in developed country markets were to be significantly lowered, then 
the quantity of tuna and smoked fish exported from Ghana is expected to be significantly 
reduced given that most of the processing industries would struggle to remain competitive. 
This would negatively affect employment and the income levels of the companies and 
individuals involved (Box 3), and, in turn, Government revenue from taxes and licences 
would also be negatively affected.  For the foreseeable future it is envisaged that Ghana will 
continue to export high-value demersal fish species and tuna and import low-value fish such 
as sardinella and mackerel to supplement the domestic supply. At the same time, fears have 
been expressed by certain sector stakeholders that the increasing export of high value 
species could result in declining availability and consumption of these types of fish locally. 
Preference erosion and subsequent decline of the local fish processing industry does not 
necessarily mean that there will be less pressure on Ghana’s fish stocks. Depending on the 
species (e.g. tuna) the latter may be caught and shipped to fish processing facilities in 
countries which have a competitive edge. Ultimately, the quantities of fish caught will depend 
on the effectiveness of the fisheries management system in place. At the same time, the 
absence of Government of Ghana (GoG) capacity-building support could have a negative 
impact on marine and freshwater stocks (Antwi et al., 2006). 
 
 
Box 3 Women’s livelihoods and their role in fish processing in Ghana 
 
As active participants in the fisheries sector and home makers, the impact of trade 
negotiations could have far-reaching implications for women’s livelihoods and the wellbeing 
of families. In a study in Elmina, Ghana, a major fishing community, it was found that 
women's incomes in the community varied depending on whether the fishing season was 
good or bad. For small tradeswomen, the income can increase from US$ 25 to US$ 40 per 
month. Fishmongers of relative importance earned between US$ 112 and US$ 470, whilst 
larger-scale fishmongers earned between US$ 430 and US$ 2,092. It must be stated that the 
most important part of their annual income is earned during the high season from July to 
September. The bulk of the income that women fish processors and mongers receive from 
their activities is spent on providing food for their families. The women also spend on medical 
care for their children, provide clothing and, to a lesser extent, pay school fees. Besides 
catering for their family needs, women also fund fishing inputs, mainly the purchase of fuel, 
from their savings (Odotei, undated). The above illustrates the typical role played by women 
in fishing communities. Should the women’s ability to play this role be affected as a result of 
the proposed trade liberalisation (e.g. tariff reductions in the major export markets may make 
smoked fish exports less competitive), then this may have serious knock-on effects on the 
nutrition, health and general wellbeing of fishing families. 
 
Source: Antwi et al. (2006) in Kleih et al. (2006) 
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Seychelles: WTO-induced tariff reductions would lead to substantial loss of employment at 
the IOT tuna cannery in Mahe, although the direct impact would be mitigated in that a 
substantial proportion of the workforce is foreign (e.g. the impact may be felt in the 
Philippines as much as in the Seychelles). There would be reduced income for the 
population of Mahe and associated lower spending power. There will be knock-on effects to 
support industries, especially the can fabricating plant and other subsidiary industries 
supplying to the cannery. The reduction in frequency of cargo vessels visiting Port Victoria 
would lead to an overall lowering of economic activity. There could also be an indirect effect 
on tuna transshipment. Were similar difficulties to affect the Mauritian and Malagache 
canneries, then regional demand would slump potentially undermining some of the case for 
transshipping in the Seychelles, so severely reducing the sector’s economic ‘critical mass’ 
(NAP Fisheries, 2006). 
 
The knock-on effects of the reduction in employment in the tuna processing industry would 
be lower earnings and increased poverty amongst the Mahe workforce and that of firms 
supplying to IOT. The reduction in overall economic activity and thus in tax receipts by 
government would lead to lowered capacity to provide key state services such as healthcare, 
and education.   
 
As for environmental impacts, the tuna fishery is managed by regional bodies in concert with 
the Seychelles authorities. A declining fisheries and processing sector could lead to a 
reduced national management and administration capacity, resulting in a reduced 
commitment to monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) activities essential to enforce the 
agreed management regimes. Although one might expect that a declining processing sector 
may have a positive effect on domestic fish stocks, there could be little impact if catches 
simply get diverted to countries with a more competitive processing industry. 
 
Uganda: A lowering of tariffs in EU import markets is expected to reduce Nile perch exports 
because of increased competition from substitutes. Stakeholders fear that the incomes of fish 
firms as well as fishermen will be reduced through reduced prices offered by exporters 
(Keizire, 2006). At the same time, the potential competitors of Ugandan Nile perch, such as 
catfish from Vietnam, already face relatively low tariffs in the major markets (e.g. 9 % in the 
EU, which could be reduced to about 5 % following further trade liberalisation). As a result, 
the consequences for Ugandan whitefish exporters are potentially less severe than expected. 
 
There are claims that food security has been affected in Uganda as a result of fish exports. 
Although there is less Nile perch and tilapia available for the domestic market, this needs to 
be weighed against the substantial amounts of income generated by the fishing industry, 
which in turn positively affects people’s access to food.  At the same time, income generated 
in the fishing communities has often not been invested in productive enterprises or saved as 
a result of lack of saving infrastructure. Keizire (2004) argues that there are also fish species 
other than those exported which are available in Uganda for domestic consumption. Whilst 
tilapia is the preferred fish consumed by local communities around Lake Victoria, some 
observers argue that Nile perch is traditionally not eaten because it is not an indigenous 
species. 
 
Nevertheless, in particular in famine situations, there are poor communities around Lake 
Victoria that have come to rely on the consumption of fish bones and other by-products from 
the processing plants. Attempts by the animal feed industry to purchase increasing amounts 
of these by-products have been curtailed by East African governments so that they remain 
available for human consumption (pers. comm. Mr Stephen Mbithi Mwikya). 
 
Although reduced markets for fish could potentially assist in the revival of fish stocks, this 
may not be the case if increased competition leads to increased catch efforts. Also, it has 
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been reported that Nile perch catches have recently declined as a result of overfishing and 
lower stocks.  
 
 
Non-ACP/LDC developing countries 
 
Thailand: In the short-term, large increases in employment and income generation by the 
tuna canning industry can be envisaged. Likewise, increased shrimp production will take 
place, but most likely at the expense of alternative coastal production of rice or other coastal 
crops (NAP Fisheries, 2006).  
 
Two forces seem set to determine the long term economic effects of liberalisation upon the 
Thai seafood sector: (i) the benefits of the opening of OECD markets and (ii) the threat of 
competition from Thailand’s neighbours. 
 
On the one hand, Thailand’s efficient, highly competitive producers and processors would 
have the potential to expand their already impressive impact upon global seafood trade 
substantially. Shrimp farming/processing and tuna canning are obvious candidates for 
expansion, but given Thailand’s flexible and entrepreneurial approach, there is no reason 
why new areas cannot develop. Indeed a move into sophisticated added-value seems an 
obvious response to fast rising demands for highly finished convenience products in 
industrialised countries.   
 
On the other hand, liberalisation will allow Thailand’s key competitors greater scope to 
undercut Thailand. Economic progress has naturally led to rising prosperity, and thus wages. 
Therefore one of Thailand’s main advantages — low cost/high quality labour — will erode 
continually. Seafood industries, especially processing, are not occupations of choice and 
Thai labour is likely to move towards better paying and more congenial hi-tech jobs. This will 
leave the seafood industry in a quandary: whether to import cheaper labour or to migrate 
their activities to lower cost areas like Vietnam, Indonesia, or China.  
 
It is difficult to judge how this will play out, because, for example, Thailand’s rising prosperity 
(and wages) will similarly be experienced by the regional competitors. Overlying this, there 
could also be major changes in the market with China and possibly India becoming major 
seafood importers as these huge economies continue to modernise and prosper. The West 
and Japan may then cease to dominate in the way they do now. Thus the outcome for 
Thailand will rely upon a very complex interplay of regional and global economic forces. 
 
As for social issues, in the short-term, gains are expected for the urbanised and semi-urban 
workforces in employment in tuna canneries. Similarly, rural workforces will see increased 
employment on shrimp farms and processing plants. In turn, there will be gains for small 
businesses supplying these industries, including the small ‘satellite’ shrimp farmers. At the 
same time, fears were expressed regarding potential losses for freshwater farmers and 
fishermen as cheaper imports might displace their products or lower their prices. 
 
In the long-term, the changes seem likely to be mostly beneficial to the Thai workforce if not 
the sector (i.e. a ‘prosperity problem’). Social problems already associated with foreign 
labour used in the fisheries might be replicated in the processing and aquaculture industries. 
At the same time, there might be a decline in rural smallholder agriculture (rice especially) 
from commercial shrimp farming, disadvantaging the communities involved who may be 
displaced. 
 
The environment is expected to be the principal longer-term loser in the development 
process of the Thai seafood industry. Coastal zone ecosystems and wetlands (both coastal 
and inland) are under particular threat, and key agricultural areas like coastal paddy are 
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under threat already. Conversely, environmental problems threaten aquaculture, namely 
water shortages inland and pollution along the coast for shrimp farming. This, rather than the 
market or trade, may turn out to be the key constraint to growth in aquaculture output 
 
India:  In economic terms, for a net exporter of fish like India, the impact of more relaxed 
tariffs is likely to be positive as it offers the opportunity to consolidate its market share and 
diversify into other markets. Preference erosion could lead to somewhat reduced profitability 
of the export sector in the short term, but might prove to be a positive change in the long 
term as it makes the supply chains more competitive and diversified, hence less risk-prone 
(Salagrama et al, 2006).  
 
As for imports, consumers, importers, retailers, processors (who intend to use their idle 
capacity for reprocessing the imported fish for re-export) would benefit from reduced tariffs, 
but this is perceived to be at the cost of livelihoods and incomes for different categories of 
stakeholders in the sector, whose capacity to hold on to their share in the value chain in the 
face of competition from imported goods is very limited.  As yet, fish imports into India are 
low (i.e. approximately one percent of exports) and have not significantly increased following 
the relaxation of import regimes over recent years. The Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with 
Thailand for the import of fish for reprocessing and exports led to protests by fishermen in 
Kerala, who complained that the imports would affect their livelihoods adversely. At the same 
time, the Seafood Exporters Association of India (SEAI) argues that fish imports from 
Thailand would address the issue of shortage of raw material in the country, which in turn 
would also lead to job creation. In sum, a country such as India may face some increased 
fish imports but not necessarily as a result of the Doha Round negotiations. On the other 
hand, the country’s net export position is likely to further improve as a result of the 
negotiations. 
 
In social terms, Indian producers are expected to be affected both due to preference erosion 
as well as due to competition at sea and at the market place by new players and products, 
but on the other hand the increased access to new markets and demand for species other 
than fish might offset this. For the secondary stakeholders (particularly women, dalits and 
other vulnerable people), the overall impact of lifting of tariffs is likely to be more negative 
than positive as this can hurt their current livelihoods, while not really offering an affordable 
means to take advantage of the new opportunities this may present. In terms of quality of life, 
the increased impoverishment of some categories of people might weaken their conditions of 
life, while the increased availability of fish at affordable prices (potentially also as a result of 
imports) might enhance consumers’ access to cheap protein and improve nutritional security. 
 
Regarding the environment, in view of Indian exporters’ traditional emphasis on shrimp, as a 
result of various trade measures the producers might decide to break out of the ‘shrimp-trap’ 
and diversify fishing and culture operations to target a number of other commercial fish 
species, thereby reducing pressure on inshore waters. Increased opportunities for export to 
new developing country markets might also support the shift away from shrimp, although 
shrimp will continue to remain a major export earner for the country. On the other hand, 
lowered tariffs, continued state support for export of shrimp and reduced margins due to 
trade measures (e.g. SPS, TBT, and antidumping) might increase demand for shrimp and 
lead to more intensive exploitation and culture practices with implications on natural resource 
health, environmental quality and biodiversity.  With increased trade-environment linkages, 
the tension between environmental conservation and livelihood needs will become more 
intense, with negative consequences for both. 
 
China: With WTO membership China has already undertaken a series of tariff reductions in 
the fisheries sector; on average import duties have fallen from 15.3 % in 2001 to 10.4 % in 
2005. For edible products the new bound rates overall are generally quite low and as such 
further tariff reductions may have little effect. This is even more the case for fishmeal which is 
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imported under a 2 % tariff and thus downward adjustment is not a significant issue. 
Reductions in tariffs may have some impact e.g. by stimulating increasing imports of raw 
material for processing — such as those for domestically marketed products (although re-
exported products can claim a rebate and hence tariff changes are neutral). Similarly for 
higher value fish/products which are an area of growing demand, tariff reductions could 
induce further expansion.  In respect of the latter the reduction in duties on shrimp may be 
significant. 
 
More important outcomes might be expected to arise from the impacts of any tariff changes 
that may take place in China’s major export markets — notably the USA and Japan. 
However, in both countries tariffs, both current and prospective, are not particularly high and 
other aspects are likely to have greater impact (e.g. anti-dumping or SPS measures).  Thus 
for the USA duties on frozen fish, molluscs and shrimp and prawns are zero rated, although 
some processed products attract duties (e.g. 7.5 percent on some processed fish and 5 
percent on canned shrimp). Overall tariffs are therefore of limited importance for China in 
major export markets — especially in comparison to economic fundamentals such as low 
domestic labour costs.  
 
A more important factor for trade may be the future course of anti-dumping activity, notably 
by the USA, which has imposed measures upon Chinese products in the past (e.g. on 
crawfish). Despite the imposition of anti dumping measures, Chinese exports of crawfish 
have continued, but this might not be the case for future US action. An additional factor is the 
application of, for example, SPS measures.   
 
As for social issues, the larger scale Chinese processing sector will offer employment and 
income opportunities, but these may be partly at the expense of potentially more labour 
intensive smaller scale enterprise. If export processors also move in to supply the greater 
part of the growing domestic market for processed items, these effects could be significantly 
greater. In location terms the expectation is that export processing will remain focused in 
coastal regions — areas where environmental pollution issues are already often the most 
intense. There continue to be major environmental pollution problems in China, in both inland 
freshwater bodies and in coastal marine areas.   
 
Peru belongs to a group of Latin American countries that benefit from zero duty access to the 
European Union as part of the GSP+ initiative. Although there may be no significant effects 
on real income expected overall, there may be some possible effects on diversification by 
artisanal fishermen to species at another price level. Levels of trade of major products are 
controlled by government quotas, therefore WTO measures would not be felt (Tilman, 2006). 
No direct effects are expected on current employment levels in the industrial plants and fleet 
that represents 21.5 % of the labour force in the fishing sector. Equally, no direct effects are 
envisaged for artisanal fishermen who are self employed along with family members and 
represent roughly 50 % of the fishing sector labour force. There could be some negative 
effect on female fish processors (10 % of labour force) if squid imports were reduced, but this 
could be replaced with the canning of other species that are a growth industry.   
 
Latin American countries that have become major exporters of tuna to the EU as a result of 
GSP+ and its predecessor initiative (e.g. Ecuador) would face increased competition from SE 
Asian tuna processing countries (e.g. Thailand). 
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6 Conclusions and Recommendations 
6.1 Conclusions 
The 40 % of world imports and the 25 % of world exports that EU countries account for 
appears at first sight to be a disproportionate amount, leading to questions regarding the 
EU’s fisheries and trade policies and whether it is capturing a disproportionate amount of 
fisheries trade. When intra-EU trade is discounted, the EU only accounts for 27 % and 4.7 % 
of world fish trade. When this, as well as fish consumption and population size in the EU, is 
taken into consideration, this does not represent a disproportionate amount of world trade. 
 
Despite this, the EU’s fisheries and trade policies may indeed have created distortions in 
international fisheries trade, giving preference to ACP countries and encouraging those 
countries to sign fisheries agreements with the EU in order to obtain ‘originating’ fish for their 
processing factories. The fisheries agreements themselves may increase trade between the 
EU and the coastal state, if EU vessels land in-country, or decrease potential fisheries trade 
that could occur, when catches are transhipped or landed directly in EU ports. 
 
The consequences of the EU fisheries policies for ACP countries are arguably clearest in the 
case of tuna processing. Cotonou and its predecessor agreements have assisted in 
establishing major tuna processing industries in countries such as Seychelles, Cote d’Ivoire, 
and Papua New Guinea. At the same time, domestic EU processing industries have been 
protected by high import tariffs. Nevertheless, the EU processing industries are struggling to 
compete with lower-cost supplies from developing countries. 
 
The key issues for ACP countries regarding EPAs and fisheries are: 
• How EPAs will affect fisheries trade flows; 
• Whether and how Rules of Origin may be relaxed; 
• How bilateral FPAs and regional EPAs may complement or conflict with each other. 
 
As for the reform of Rules of Origin, the challenge will be to increase the flexibility for 
developing countries in sourcing raw material for their processing industries, and negotiate 
value-added thresholds that are development-friendly. 
 
The WTO Doha Round negotiations were suspended in July 2006 due to deadlock over 
issues such as agricultural subsidies. At the end of 2006, informal meetings of several of the 
WTO negotiating groups restarted and full-scale negotiations resumed in early February 
2007, although confidence in the political will to conclude the negotiations is lacking. 
 
If the negotiations are brought to a successful conclusion they will have an impact on 
fisheries mainly through two areas: 
• Market access (i.e. tariff measures) as part of the negotiations on non-agricultural 
market access (NAMA); 
• Subsidies to the fisheries sector in different forms, which are being discussed by the 
WTO Negotiating Group on Rules.  
 
The main WTO Doha Round related question in this study is related to the potential impacts 
of a reduced margin of preference (i.e. tariff cuts as part of NAMA negotiations). The study 
shows that the impact of a reduced margin of preference will be greatest where current rates 
are relatively high and for product areas of major importance in EU markets (e.g. tuna and 
shrimp). For example, traditional Spanish tuna processing industries are likely to lose out and 
follow their Italian and French counterparts into high-end niche markets. This is expected to 
lead to job losses. 
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Developing countries can be grouped into those that currently enjoy preferential market 
access (e.g. Cotonou Agreement, GSP+, EBA) and those that do not or only at a relatively 
small scale (e.g. tariff quota for canned tuna benefiting Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia). 
Countries that are currently ‘protected’ by high tariffs on processed products (e.g. canned 
tuna) will suffer from preference erosion which will have negative knock-on effects for their 
economies. At the same time, preference erosion is already underway for ACP countries in 
that other developing countries also increasingly benefit from preferential market access 
(GSP+ mainly for a group of Latin American countries, and EBA for Least Developed 
Countries). Asian producers and processors such as Thailand or India are likely to be main 
beneficiaries. 
 
6.2 Recommendations 
Fisheries bring substantial benefits to many developing countries and in particular ACP 
countries. In order for the benefits of foreign currency earnings that countries gain from 
export of fish and fisheries products to be sustained, effective fisheries management is a 
prerequisite. As a result, reduction or redeployment of fishing capacity in order to reduce 
overcapacity of fishing fleets, and related overfishing of capture fisheries is neccesary in 
some areas. Combating illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing should also be a priority.  
 
Capacity building and institutional support in both fisheries management and trade issues are 
needed for developing and ACP countries. This can include raising awareness of fisheries 
management personnel about the ongoing trade negotiations, as well as raising the 
awareness of trade and finance ministers of fisheries issues.  
 
Capacity building in relation to non-tariff market barriers (e.g. strengthening of standard 
boards or competent authorities), would help developing country suppliers engage fully in the 
world market. Furthermore, investments for the provision of infrastructure, support systems 
and modern efficient technology could help make developing country suppliers more 
competitive. Some of this support could be provided through Aid for Trade initiatives. 
Technologies that have adverse impacts on the environment should be avoided. 
 
In relation to the current trade negotiations, special and differential treatment of small-scale 
and artisanal fisheries in developing countries with regard to fisheries subsidies measures 
should be considered, but also recognising that they can in some cases contribute to 
overfishing.  
 
If tariffs were to be implemented as part of the WTO Doha Round, there should be a gradual 
rather than sudden reduction. This should allow fisheries and processing industries to adapt 
to changes in both economic and social terms. Development assistance or other support 
from the international community would help cover losses from preference erosion. 
 
In relation to the EPA negotiations, improvement of Rules of Origin will be particularly 
important for ACP countries. Any changes in the RoO should aim to benefit developing 
countries in sourcing raw material for their processing industries. This will require the 
identification of ‘development friendly’ value-added thresholds (e.g. 10–25 %) as part of the 
EPA negotiations. 
 
ACP countries should explore and develop marketing initiatives such as new domestic, 
regional or overseas markets, and targeting of ‘higher-end’ quality markets, in order to 
diversify and avoid over-reliance on traditional markets (e.g. canned tuna market) in which 
they may become less competitive under new tariff regimes. The private sector can play an 
active role in this. 
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Appendix 1: Global fish production, trade and consumption patterns 
 
 
Table 1: Total production of food fish, 1997 and 2020 
 Actual 1997 Projected 2020 
 Million 
tonnes 
Share from 
aquaculture
Million 
tonnes 
Share from 
aquaculture
China 33.3 58% 53.1 66% 
Southeast Asia 12.6 18% 17.5 29% 
India 4.8 40% 8.0 55% 
Other South Asia 2.1 23% 3.0 39% 
Latin America 6.4 10% 8.8 16% 
West Asia and North Africa 2.2 9% 2.8 16% 
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.7 1% 6.0 2% 
United States 4.4 10% 4.9 16% 
Japan 5.2 15% 5.2 20% 
European Union 15 5.9 21% 6.7 29% 
Eastern Europe and former Soviet 
Union 
4.9 4% 5.0 4% 
Other developed countries 4.8 12% 5.8 20% 
Developing world 68.0 37% 102.5 47% 
Developing world excluding China 34.6 17% 49.4 27% 
Developed world 25.2 13% 27.6 19% 
World 93.2 31% 130.1 41% 
Source: Delgado et al (2003);  
Note: Actual data were calculated by authors from FAO 2002a; projections for 2020 are from the 
baseline scenario of IFPRI’s IMPACT model (July 2002). Actual data are three-year averages centred 
on 1997. Projected growth rates are exponential, compounded annually using three-year averages as 
endpoints. 
Projections are based on the most likely (baseline) scenario. 
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Appendix 2: Seafood tariffs 
 
Table 1: EU Tariffs generally applying to seafood products imported into the EU 
 
Item*  CN Code 
(Eurostat) 
Conventional duty Notes 
Fresh freshwater fish 
(nei) 0302 69 11 8% 
Ad valorem 
throughout 
Fresh marine fish (nei) 0302 69 99 15%  
Fresh/frozen small 
pelagics 0303 7130/7490/7991 
13-15% 
 (0-23% seasonally) 
Sardines, mackerel 
etc 
Frozen freshwater fish 
(nei) 0303 79 19 8%  
Salmon fresh/frozen 
whole 
0302 1200, 0303 
11,19, 22 2% 
Atlantic & Pacific 
salmon 
Frozen marine fish (nei) 0303 79 98 15%  
Freshwater fish fillets 
(nei) 0304 10 19 9% Fresh fillets 
Fresh marine fish fillets 0304 10 98 15% Quotas apply 
Freshwater fish fillets 
(nei) 0304 20 19  9% Frozen fillets 
Frozen marine fish fillets 0304 20 97  7.5% Frozen fillets 
Salmon fresh/frozen fillet 0304 1030, 203 2% Atlantic & Pacific salmon 
Frozen surimi 0304 90 05 15%  
Dried/smoked fish 0305 4980/5980/6950 12-14%  
Smoked salmon 0305 4100 13% Atlantic & Pacific salmon 
Fresh/frozen rock lobster 030611 12.5%  
Fresh/frozen Penaeid 
shrimp 0306 1350/1380/2390 12% ie Raw farmed shrimp 
Fresh/frozen crabs 0306 1490/2480 7.5%  
Frozen squid 0307 49 6-8% Various quotas @ 3-3.5% 
Frozen tuna loins 1604 14 16  24% 4,000tn quota @ 6% 
Canned tuna in oil or 
brine 1604 14 11/18 24% 
Quota Asians @12% 
duty 
Canned small pelagics 1604 1500/1600 12.5%-25% Sardines 12.5% anchovies 25% 
Salmon added value 1604 1100, 2010 5.5% Canned & processed 
Canned/processed 
shrimp 1605 20 20%  
Canned/processed crab 1605 1000 8%  
Canned/processed 
molluscs 1605 90 20% Including squid 
Source: Commission Regulation (EC) No 1719/2005 to Annex 1 of Council Regulation No 2658/87. 
Also Council regulations No 975/2003 & 379/2004 for reduced duty quotas  nei = not elsewhere 
indicated (i.e. a general category), in NAP Fisheries and NRI (2006). 
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Table 2: Selected country average seafood tariffs (extracted from Melchior, 2005)14 
 
Tariff average  
Country 
 
Tariff type Simple, 
tariff line 
Simple, 
6 - digit 
Import 
weighted 
Weighted 
by world 
imports 
European 
Union 
Bound 13.0 11.7 11.8 12.0 
European 
Union 
MFN applied 12.5 11.7 11.8 11.9 
European 
Union 
Actually applied 5.2 4.6 4.3 4.7 
Ghana Bound 79.3 79.3 40.0 99.0 
Ghana MFN applied 11.4 11.3 6.4 12.8 
Ghana Actually applied 11.1 11.1 6.4 14.1 
Mozambique Bound 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Mozambique MFN applied 24.0 24.2 9.8 23.8 
Mozambique Actually applied 23.1 23.5 9.8 22.7 
Namibia Bound 37.0 37.0  37.0 
Namibia MFN applied 6.0 4.8  5.3 
Namibia Actually applied 12.9 7.8 5.5 4.8 
Nigeria Bound 110.0 110.0  78.4 
Nigeria MFN applied 31.3 28.1  32.7 
Nigeria Actually applied 18.4 18.4 7.5 31.6 
Senegal Bound 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 
Senegal MFN applied 14.5 14.5 18.8 16.8 
Senegal Actually applied 17.6 17.6 18.8 18.1 
Seychelles Bound     
Seychelles MFN applied 84.4 84.4 93.1 87.5 
Seychelles Actually applied 48.4 48.4 93.1 70.6 
Tanzania Bound 120.0 120.0 120.0 120.0 
Tanzania MFN applied 24.1 24.4 25.0 4.8 
Tanzania Actually applied 23.9 23.8 24.9 24.0 
NB: In many cases, the percentage of bound tariffs is quite small 
 
                                                
14 Melchior, A (2005) The Fishy Story About Tariffs in World Seafood Trade; Paper written for 
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Rome). 
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Appendix 3: The Swiss Formula 
 
The Swiss Formula and the coefficients to be used for tariff cuts as part of the NAMA (Non-
Agricultural Market Access) negotiations form a key aspect of the WTO Doha Round. The 
use of two different coefficients is being considered for developed countries (around 10) and 
developing countries (20 – 30). The effect of the Swiss formula is to reduce high tariffs 
proportionately more than lower tariffs. 
 
The chart below illustrates to what extent the maximum new tariff is determined by the 
coefficient, i.e. it cannot exceed the value of the coefficient no matter how high the old tariff 
was. 
 
Swiss Formula:  t1 = (A x t0) / (A + t0)  
 
A = coefficient 
t0 = old tariff 
t1 = new tariff 
 
 
      Swiss Formula; calculation of new tariffs using coefficient of 12   
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Appendix 4: EPA negotiating groups 
 
The six ACP Groups negotiating EPAs with the European Union 
 
 
Table 1.1: ACP Groups Negotiating EPAs
CEMAC ECOWAS ESA7 SADC CARIFORUM Pacific Forum
Cameroon2 Benin1,2 Burundi1,5 Angola1,4 Antigua & Barbuda2,6 Cook Islands3,4,6
Central African Republic1,2,5 Burkina Faso1,2,5 Comores1,3,6 Botswana2,4,5 The Bahamas2,3,6 Fiji4,6
Chad1,5 Côte d'Ivoire2 Djibouti1 Lesotho1,2,4,5 Barbados2,6 Kiribati1,3,4,6
Republic of Congo2 Guinea-Bissau1,2,5 Eritea1,3 Mozambique1,4 Belize2,6 Marshall Islands3,4,6
DR Congo1 Mali1,2,5 Ethiopia1,3,5 Namibia4 Dominica2,6 Federated States of Micronesia3,4,6
Gabon2 Niger1,2,5 Kenya8 Tanzania1,8 Dominican Republic4,6 Nauru3,4,6
Equatorial Guinea1,2,3 Senegal1,2 Madagascar1 Swaziland2,4,5 Grenada2,6 Niue3,4,6
Sao Tome & Principe1,3,4,6 Togo1,2 Malawi1,5 Guyana2,6 Palau3,4,6
Cape Verde1,3,4,6 Mauritius6 Haiti1,2,6 Papua New Guinea4,6
Gambia1,4 Rwanda1,5 Jamaica2,6 Samoa1,3,4,6
Ghana4 Seychelles3,6 St. Kitt & Nevis2,6 Solomon Islands1,4,6
Guinea1,4 Sudan3 Saint Lucia2,6 Tonga4,6
Liberia1,3,4 Uganda1,5,8 St. Vincent & the Grenadines2,6 Tuvalu1,3,4,6
Nigeria4 Zambia1,5 Suriname2,6 Vanuatu1,3,4,6
Sierra Leone1,4 Zimbabwe5 Trinidad & Tobago2,6
1 - Least Developed Country
2 - Has a common external tariff (Customs Union) with other Members of group
3 - Not a WTO Member/ in the WTO Accession Process
4 - Not a Member of the Customs Union but has Preferential/Free Trade Agreement with other Members of Group
5 - Land-Locked Country
6 - Small Island Developing State
7 - Group does not Represent a Regional Economic Community
8 - Belongs to a Customs Union with countries of other negotiating group
Africa Group
 
 
Source: FAO and ACP Secretariat (2006) 
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Appendix 5: EU fish supply lines 
 
EU Fisheries Trade with ACP Countries, by EPA Group 
 
EU Fisheries Imports from CARIFORUM Countries (in '000 Euros)
Origin 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
Antigua&Barbuda 951            556            522            1,185         
The Bahamas 30,691       30,158       37,068       
Barbados 9                16              24              8                
Belize 308            532            5,912         
Dominica 7                3                
Dominican Rep. 126            151            192            5                
Grenada 1,167         1,081         1,086         
Guyana 48              2,326         2,327         31              
Haiti 15              40              12              
Jamaica 2,818         2,473         3,286         
St Kitt & Nevis 734            
Saint Lucia 1                
St Vincent&the Gren. 56              
Suriname 20,265       15,003       12,351       
Trinidad & Tobago 39              
Total 56,405      52,393       62,822     5              742          1,216         
EU Fisheries Exports to CARIFORUM Countries (in '000 Euros)
Destination 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
Antigua&Barbuda 93              188            28              30              38              58              
The Bahamas 254            525            45              27              60              270            
Barbados 272            290            247            77              18              57              
Belize 1                77              70              345            182            18              
Dominica 66              5                386            6                4                
Dominican Rep. 1,140         827            999            972            432            714            
Grenada 41              48              28              3                15              3                
Guyana 3                3                11              
Haiti 1,131         1,038         1,116         669            201            197            
Jamaica 1,148         495            701            1,070         653            1035
St Kitt & Nevis 9,603         1,737         37              
Saint Lucia 87              4                167            58              25              34              
St Vincent&the Gren. 21              5                14              3                1                8                
Suriname 43              55              132            80              65              83              
Trinidad & Tobago 12              17              16              6                30              39              
Total 13,912      5,306         3,605       3,729       1,729       2,531         
Unprocessed fisheries products Processed fisheries products
Unprocessed fisheries products Processed fisheries products
  
 
 
Source: Eurostat - http://fd.comext.eurostat.cec.eu.int/xtweb/ 
Dataset: DS-016890 - EU25 Trade since 1995 by CN8  
Unprocessed products: CN Code 03, Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic 
invertebrates 
Processed fisheries products: CN Codes 16041100 - 16059090 
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EU Fisheries Imports from CEMAC Countries (in '000 Euros)
Origin 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
Cameroon 1,022         360            82              
Central African Rep. 2                
Chad
Republic of Congo 3,277         3,916         3,858         
DR Congo 208            157            101            
Gabon 16,291       18,288       19,203       
Equatorial Guinea 3                
Sao Tome&Principe
Total 20,801      22,721       23,246     -           -           -             
EU Fisheries Exports to CEMAC Countries (in '000 Euros)
Destination 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
Cameroon 1,118         181            78              53              24              23              
Central African Rep. 3                2                
Chad 13              44              31              85              51              84              
Republic of Congo 477            683            294            78              85              157            
DR Congo 171            188            333            79              64              156            
Gabon 1,053         899            485            130            174            132            
Equatorial Guinea 686            602            543            32              40              27              
Sao Tome&Principe 31              42              30              179            50              33              
Total 3,549         2,639         1,794       639          488          614            
Unprocessed fisheries products Processed fisheries products
Unprocessed fisheries products Processed fisheries products
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EU Fisheries Imports from ECOWAS Countries, plus Mauritania (in '000 Euros)
Origin 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
Benin 1,981         876            559            
Burkina Faso 15              
Cape Verde 277            864            8,751         20              88              88              
Cote d'Ivoire 11,847       12,121       12,503       120,773     124,327     82,810       
Gambia 1,887         1,778         972            
Ghana 29,807       28,851       22,509       71,961       59,987       66,136       
Guinea 24,072       21,053       21,784       71              52              39
Guinea-Bissau 5,015         3,423         2,095         
Liberia 3                
Mali 36              18              27              
Mauritania 106,706     89,020       93,193       379            1,568         1,022         
Niger 9                66              30              
Nigeria 50,891       47,970       49,882       35              
Sierra Leone 9                1                10              
Senegal 187,918     169,314     158,922     24,855       21,132       19,135       
Togo 10,130       2,639         22              
Total 430,600     377,121     371,576   218,618   207,154   169,265     
EU Fisheries Exports to ECOWAS Countries, plus Mauritania (in '000 Euros)
Destination 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
Benin 736            590            5                11              10              30              
Burkina Faso 7                5                27              10              25              25              
Cape Verde 301            307            522            125            102            72              
Cote d'Ivoire 62,635       50,870       33,807       275            156            115            
Gambia 8                7                49              4                21              3                
Ghana 8,418         11,556       10,112       50              206            112            
Guinea 55              5                4                12              8                5                
Guinea-Bissau 2                19              70              56              9                8                
Liberia 626            406            335            17              74              108            
Mali 21              17              13              7                1                
Mauritania 125            57              341            47              55              135
Niger 3                5                32              58              3                
Nigeria 150,089     120,352     129,862     109            29              91              
Sierra Leone 512            173            35              175            115            37              
Senegal 4,479         4,187         5,125         89              337            131            
Togo 634            31              9                8                35              14              
Total 228,651     188,565     180,325   1,033       1,247       890            
Unprocessed fisheries products Processed fisheries products
Unprocessed fisheries products Processed fisheries products
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EU Fisheries Imports from ESA Countries (in '000 Euros)
Origin 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
Burundi 90              96              100            
Comoros
Djibouti
Eritrea 681            428            25              
Ethiopia 7                1                
Kenya 28,491       31,738       26,358       9,442         25,771       32,647       
Madagascar 129,149     115,829     99,252       48,218       43,076       40,057       
Mauritius 5,073         5,006         6,504         60,157       67,932       75,765       
Malawi 210            227            236            
Rwanda
Seychelles 43,359       59,632       51,341       168,257     143,248     147,578     
Sudan 4                1                
Uganda 59,237       77,151       113,259     2                4                
Zambia 253            221            174            143            
Zimbabwe 2,547         2,295         1,564         
Total 269,097     292,627     298,814   286,219   280,027   296,052     
EU Fisheries Exports to ESA Countries (in '000 Euros)
Destination 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
Burundi 24              32              3                26              55              
Comoros 26              44              
Djibouti 73              56              72              41              55              168            
Eritrea 111            46              73              52              38              17              
Ethiopia 41              20              8                13              12              30              
Kenya 1,529         10,642       5,492         326            113            43              
Madagascar 14,988       11,586       12,628       17              42              22              
Mauritius 15,822       19,038       31,131       133            160            580            
Malawi
Rwanda 5                2                8                2                
Seychelles 57,918       55,337       53,758       8                12              
Sudan 25              2                53              11              15              37              
Uganda 37              18              4                61              35              79              
Zambia 5                11              1                
Zimbabwe 2                7                7                3                
Total 90,582       96,833       103,266   665          499          1,046         
Processed fisheries productsUnprocessed fisheries products
Unprocessed fisheries products Processed fisheries products
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EU Fisheries Imports from Pacific Forum Countries (in '000 Euros)
Origin 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
Cook Islands 51              36              4                
Fiji 1,741         844            1,083         
Kiribati 1                
Marshall Islands 38              47              43              
Micronesia 24              
Nauru 31              
Niue 2                
Palau 5                15              
Papua NG 7                57              1,291         24,021       25,905       38,613       
Samoa
Solomon Islands 5                4                8                3,537         7,311         
Tonga 9                67              42              
Tuvalu 5                5                
Vanuatu 10              11              168            
Total 1,874        1,066         2,714       24,021     29,442     45,924       
EU Fisheries Exports to Pacific Forum Countries (in '000 Euros)
Destination 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
Cook Islands 94              39              2                
Fiji
Kiribati 52              50              
Marshall Islands 3                2                
Micronesia
Nauru 22              
Niue
Palau
Papua NG
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Tonga
Tuvalu 1                
Vanuatu 2                3                1                
Total 122           2               -           91            55            1                
Unprocessed fisheries products Processed fisheries products
Unprocessed fisheries products Processed fisheries products
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EU Fisheries Imports from SADC Countries (in '000 Euros)
Origin 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
Angola 2,041         1,209         16,936       
Botswana
Lesotho 4                22              
Mozambique 59,067       51,647       63,329       33              5                5                
Namibia 254,737     244,170     216,340     1,210         3,275         6,390         
Swaziland 191            91              
Tanzania 128,307     120,566     131,718     12              55
Total 444,347     417,592     428,436   1,255       3,280       6,450         
EU Fisheries Exports to SADC Countries (in '000 Euros)
Destination 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
Angola 3,638         5,283         6,558         2,133         1,863         1,597         
Botswana 1                
Lesotho 3                1                1                
Mozambique 2                56              114            228            455            768            
Namibia 103            54              1,054         28              63              79              
Swaziland 76              119            123            
Tanzania 39              155            18              46              35              14              
Total 3,782        5,548         7,747       2,512       2,536       2,582         
Processed fisheries productsUnprocessed fisheries products
Unprocessed fisheries products Processed fisheries products
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EU tuna landings by main tuna fishing states & by species; (000 tonnes) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Country 
Spain 289 255 277 307 301 
France 152 136 161 175 179 
Italy 7 10 13 22 25 
Portugal 4 5 8 7 9 
Total 453 406 460 511 515 
Species  
Skipjack 199 175 217 222 231 
Bluefin 18 17 18 16 16 
Albacore 28 22 22 26 23 
Yellowfin 151 155 160 210 216 
Bigeye 58 37 45 36 29 
Tuna total 453 406 460 511 515 
Source: NAP Fisheries (2006) based on FAO statistics, NB: 2004 estimate is a forecast 
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EU net tuna imports by major importing state, (000 tonnes) 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Production (landings) 
Spain 255 277 307 301 
Italy 10 13 22 25 
France 136 161 175 179 
Net fresh tuna import 
Spain 2 1 4 -2 
Italy 2 -1 5 1 
France 0 -2 3 4 
Net frozen tuna import 
Spain 62 64 12 -46 
Italy 32 36 34 28 
France -143 -109 -174 -164 
Net frozen tuna loins import 
Spain -1 9 30 25 
Italy 28 30 35 31 
France 15 12 13 12 
Canned tuna imports (intra & extra EU) 
UK 123 138 131 133 
France 92 117 107 107 
Germany 74 86 92 81 
Italy 51 61 69 74 
Netherlands 15 33 33 31 
Spain 8 10 18 20 
Belgium  12 13 14 13 
Other 39 42 47 43 
Total 414 500 512 502 
  Source: NAP Fisheries, based on Eurostat trade data,  
(Note, negative value = a net export) 
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EU – Tuna Supply Lines 
 
Annual canned tuna imports, United Kingdom, in 1000 tonnes 
Source 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Seychelles 23.3 29.4 23.9 29.5 28.8 
Mauritius 22.5 23.4 23.1 29.5 24.9 
Thailand 16.9 17.6 18.2 13.1 15.9 
Philippines 6.0 8.5 7.7 6.2 9.7 
Indonesia 4.7 6.8 4.3 3.1 2.8 
Maldives 2.7 3.4 3.4 4.1 4.6 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.3 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.0 
Others 47.6 48.0 48.9 46.6 45.9 
Total 124.0 137.2 130.2 132.2 132.6 
Source: Globefish, September 2006, Tuna Market Report - EU 
 
 
Annual tuna imports - Fresh and frozen whole, Spain, in 1000 tonnes 
 
Source 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Panama 11.0 18.1 24.4 5.7 23.0 
Seychelles * * 14.6 20.3 32.6 
Ghana 6.0 8.8 6.8 2.6 8.2 
France 17.7 14.9 18.0 30.1 20.7 
Netherlands Antilles 19.8 20.7 29.0 2.2 0.0 
Morocco 3.4 5.6 4.1 4.0 4.0 
Ecuador 15.9 7.0 2.2 1.8 3.0 
Guatemala 21.4 17.1 13.5 6.5 9.7 
Mexico 7.9 8.5 17.9 1.0 5.8 
Korea Rep. 5.4 9.1 3.0 0.0 3.9 
USA 0.2 6.2 10.6 6.1 3.5 
Taiwan PC 7.8 10.6 4.0 0.1 2.5 
Colombia 1.1 1.8 1.5 0.0 0.5 
Venezuela 21.8 27.1 9.6 0.1 0.0 
Belize 2.5 NA 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 157.9 206.6 187.0 101.1 158.5 
Source: Globefish, October 2006, Tuna Market Report - EU 
 
 
Annual tuna imports - loins, Spain, in 1000 tonnes 
Source 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
El Salvador * * 0.5 8.7 13.2 
Ecuador 4.0 5.6 19.0 7.2 8.8 
Guatemala * * * * 6.6 
Venezuela 0.0 3.8 5.7 2.9 0.1 
Colombia 1.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Total 6.3 12.5 31.9 26.5 35.8 
Source: Globefish, October 2006, Tuna Market Report - EU 
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Annual canned tuna imports, France, in 1000 tonnes 
Source 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Cote d'Ivoire 33.4 41.0 30.3 33.7 21.6 
Spain 15.2 13.8 19.1 18.6 21.8 
Madagascar 9.3 10.0 14.4 12.9 14.7 
Seychelles 8.6 11.0 12.6 14.7 11.3 
Senegal 4.9 6.7 6.9 4.9 4.3 
Italy 3.6 6.2 9.8 7.3 8.0 
Ecuador     7.2 
Ghana 5.3 3.5 5.3 5.1 6.5 
Others 10.6 25.2 17.4 9.9 12.5 
Total 90.9 117.4 115.8 107.1 107.9 
Source: Globefish, September 2006, Tuna Market Report - EU 
 
 
Annual frozen tuna loin imports, France, in 1000 tonnes 
Source 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Thailand 0.0 0.5 3.3 1.8 1.6 
Italy 3.2 2.6 2.1 3.9 3.8 
Ghana 0.0 0.0 0.7 1.1 1.7 
Ecuador 11.1 8.3 5.2 3.2 2.9 
Total 14.3 11.4 11.3 10.0 10.0 
Source: Globefish, October 2006, Tuna Market Report - EU 
 
Annual canned tuna imports, Italy, in 1000 tonnes 
Source 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Spain 33.0 33.1 35.0 36.1 37.0 
Colombia 0.6 2.2 3.7 6.4 7.0 
Cote d'Ivoire 5.9 9.2 9.9 14.0 8.9 
Seychelles 7.3 6.8 7.7 4.6 7.0 
France 0.5 3.3 5.2 6.1 4.6 
Portugal 2.2 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.8 
Others 2.5 3.9 5.2 4.3 4.2 
Total 52.0 61.1 69.4 74.1 71.5 
Source: Globefish, September 2006, Tuna Market Report - EU 
 
Annual frozen tuna loin imports, Italy, in 1000 tonnes 
Source 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Ecuador 15.2 9.9 13.0 12.6 12.0 
Colombia 12.6 10.8 14.6 12.8 14.3 
Kenya 2.3 5.7 2.9 7.0 8.1 
Thailand 0.5 2.1 1.8 1.1 1.3 
Spain 0.9 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Others 3.7 1.2 4.1 2.6 4.9 
Total 35.2 29.8 36.4 36.1 40.6 
Source: Globefish, October 2006, Tuna Market Report - EU 
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Annual canned tuna imports, Germany, in 1000 tonnes 
Source 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Philippines 20.5 28.5 29.4 19.1 20.3 
Thailand 5.1 9.3 9.6 5.6 11.5 
Ecuador 2.2 4.1 4.8 13.7 14.6 
Papua NG 2.0 5.2 8.7 10.7 9.6 
Indonesia 1.3 2.1 2.7 3.5 7.0 
Seychelles 6.9 8.2 10.6 5.4 6.6 
France 9.2 16.8 13.7 7.3 5.7 
Others 21.3 11.5 12.2 15.9 8.5 
Total 68.5 85.7 91.7 81.2 83.8 
Source: Globefish, September 2006, Tuna Market Report - EU 
 
 
Annual canned tuna imports, USA, in 1000 tonnes 
Source 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Thailand 64.0 68.5 79.9 71.8 77.4 
Philippines 28.2 34.2 38.4 43.3 43.8 
Ecuador 14.6 23.6 23.4 24.7 15.5 
Indonesia 15.2 14.2 16.9 17.0 18.0 
Others 10.5 12.4 8.9 12.0 14.3 
Total 132.5 152.9 167.5 168.8 169.0 
Source: Globefish, November 2006, Tuna Market Report – US 
 
 
Annual imports of tuna products other than canned tuna, USA, in 1000 tonnes 
Source 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Frozen tuna 45.1 17.9 19.3 11.0 10.5 
Tuna loins 32.4 35.4 43.8 44.0 46.7 
Fresh tuna 23.0 24.4 25.6 26.4 25.9 
Tuna in foil pouches  18.6 40.7 32.3 36.0 
Source: Globefish, November 2006, Tuna Market Report – US 
 
 
The Impact of EU Commercial Fisheries Policies and Practice on International Trade in Fisheries Products 
 
73 
 Tuna Prices  
 
 (Source: Globefish – various tuna market reports) 
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Source: Globefish, September 2006, Tuna Market Report - EU 
 
 
 
Source: Globefish, November 2006, Tuna Market Report – US 
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Shrimp 
 
Total EU Imports of shrimp (all product types), by country of origin, in 1000 tonnes 
 
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Greenland 45.3 69.2 69.1 74.3 81.7 
Denmark 39.1 41.4 45.3 46.8 48.5 
Netherlands 36.3 47.5 45.7 49.0 47.0 
Ecuador 13.3 12.9 19.4 31.1 43.8 
India 19.1 34.1 41.5 36.9 41.5 
Brazil * * 37.2 42.9 40.1 
Canada 23.0 19.6 27.2 32.2 37.4 
China 21.6 3.0 1.2 3.5 34.3 
Indonesia 16.2 16.0 27.6 30.6 26.2 
Belgium 17.9 21.1 28.9 26.7 23.1 
Iceland 26.2 26.0 28.9 24.5 10.1 
Germany * * 14.0 17.2 18.8 
Norway 22.6 21.1 19.3 18.4 18.3 
Vietnam * * * * 17.4 
UK 24.6 26.0 22.8 20.0 15.3 
Malaysia 13.4 12.5 22.6 19.5 14.6 
Spain 14.8 16.4 15.1 18.0 12.5 
Colombia * * * * 12.3 
Thailand 14.7 7.2 5.0 7.5 12.0 
Madagascar * * * * 10.1 
Morocco * * 13.7 9.5 10.0 
Mozambique * * * * 7.8 
Argentina 49.3 47.8 39.5 27.5 6.6 
Bangladesh 16.2 19.7 23.8 21.4 4.7 
Faeroe Isles 13.5 8.8 9.5 4.7 3.5 
Others 155.0 177.4 151.0 140.3 95.9 
Intra-EU 162.2 189.0 195.2 200.7 539.4? 
Extra-EU 420.0 438.7 513.1 501.8 729.3? 
Total 582.2 627.7 708.3 702.5 702.5? 
* = Included under ‘Others’ 
Source: Globefish, based on Eurostat 
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Total EU Imports of chilled and frozen shrimp, by country of origin, in 1000 tonnes 
 
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Greenland 33.0 55.5 56.0 57.4 58.3 
Ecuador 13.3 12.7 19.2 30.6 43.1 
Brazil * * 37.1 42.8 40.1 
India 17.4 33.1 40.2 34.8 38.4 
Netherlands 26.1 36.3 33.5 37.6 35.4 
China 20.7 2.9 1.1 3.5 33.5 
Denmark 24.5 27.0 28.9 29.7 30.7 
Bangladesh 15.3 18.7 22.3 20.6 23.7 
Canada 15.4 10.6 14.7 15.7 20.3 
Indonesia * * * * 20.0 
Belgium 13.7 16.7 23.1 21.0 17.5 
Germany * * * * 14.7 
Vietnam * * * * 12.8 
France * * * * 12.1 
Colombia * * * * 11.9 
Spain 13.9 15.6 14.2 17.4 11.8 
UK 17.7 19.2 18.0 15.7 11.6 
Malaysia * * * * 10.3 
Madagascar * * * * 10.1 
Mozambique * * * * 7.8 
Argentina 49.6 47.8 39.5 27.5 6.6 
Thailand 8.0 2.4 0.7 2.1 4.8 
Other 180.4 192.4 209.7 197.6 97.5 
Total 449.0 490.9 558.2 554.0 573.0 
* = Included under ‘Others’ 
Source: Globefish, based on Eurostat 
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Spanish Shrimp Imports - tonnes 
 
Origin 2004 2005 
China 2,700 26,470 
Brazil  17,880 16,840 
Ecuador 10,080 15,600 
Colombia 6,990 9,620 
Argentina 20,720 5,320 
Others 87,290 82,040 
Total 145,660 155,890 
Source: Globefish – Shrimp market report –  
 February 2006 - Spain 
 
UK Shrimp imports – Jan – Oct; tonnes 
Origin Jan – Oct 
2004 
Jan-Oct 
2005 
Iceland 15,400 11,500 
India 8,620 8,620 
Bangladesh 6,870 7,790 
Ecuador 2,660 2,280 
Others 40,320 42,510 
Total 73,870 72,700 
Source: Globefish – Shrimp market report –  
 January 2006 
 
French shrimp imports – Jan – Oct; tonnes 
Origin Jan – Oct 
2004 
Jan-Oct 
2005 
Brazil 20,200 19,780 
Madagascar 9,380 7,740 
Ecuador 4,660 6,770 
Netherlands 5,880 5,570 
Other 39,250 39,570 
Total 79,370 79,430 
Source: Globefish – Shrimp market report –  
 January 2006 
 
Italian shrimp imports – Jan – Oct; tonnes 
Origin Jan – Oct 
2004 
Jan-Oct 
2005 
Ecuador 9,000 12,020 
Denmark 4,870 5,310 
India 3,260 3,440 
Spain 4,430 3,290 
Others 23,620 25,730 
Total 45,180 49,790 
Source: Globefish – Shrimp market report –  
 January 2006 
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Shrimp prices 
 
 
 
Source: Globefish, European Price Report – Issue 12/06; 16 December 2006 
 
 
 
Whitefish 
 
Spanish hake imports - frozen whole/H&G - tonnes 
 
Origin 2004 2005 
Namibia 16,800 8,700 
Argentina 10,600 6,400 
South Africa 9,200 7,900 
Chile 8,400 6,800 
Others 7,300 7,800 
Total 52,300 37,600 
Source: Globefish – Hake market report – March 2006 
NB: In 2005, total Spanish hake imports fell almost  
14% to less than 160,000 tonnes compared to the previous year. 
 
 
Exports of Nile perch fillets to the EU – tonnes 
 
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Kenya 2,747 3,972 5,086 6,737 5,176 
Tanzania 23,063 23,119 26,965 30,813 23,880 
Uganda 14,776 12,213 13,062 18,539 23,793 
Total 40,586 39,303 45,113 56,089 52,849 
Source: Globefish 
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Appendix 6: Cost of Compliance with International Standards 
 
 
Case study: The Impact of Fish Export Bans in Uganda 
 
According to several studies, the fish export bans faced by Uganda during the 1990s as a 
result of EU HACCP regulations led to losses of over US$30 million. For example, UNIDO 
(2003) estimates that the ban of April to August 1999 alone resulted in a loss of US$36.9 
million. It further estimated the loss to fishing communities in the form of reduced prices and 
less fishing activity at US$4.25 million. Moreover, it was estimated that out of over 100,000 
people who were directly employed in the fisheries sector, 32,000 people lost their jobs as a 
result of the ban while others earned less than one third  of their average income. It is also 
estimated that over 300,000 people from families directly depending on fishing as a household 
activity were affected. 
 
During the whole period of the ban (1997-2000), there were 11 operating fish factories in 
Uganda. The fish ban resulted into the closure of 3 of the 11 factories while the remaining ones 
had to operate at less than 20% capacity. This also resulted into factories laying off 60% to 70% 
of their labour force. Other auxiliary industries such as packing, the fishnet manufactures, the 
transport industry, the fuel industry and Uganda's economy in general were directly affected and 
all the people involved suffered the direct consequences of the EU fish export ban. 
 
In Uganda, measures to comply with the international fish trade requirements are estimated 
to have increased the operating costs of fish processing plants by 50% (UNIDO, 2003).  In 
addition, costs were incurred as a result of efforts to streamline the fish inspection services 
and the capacity of the Department of Fisheries as the ‘Competent Authority’ (e.g. training of 
inspectors, provision of equipment, and introduction of a fish inspection manual). 
 
In Uganda, in regard to the impact of globalisation on fish utilisation and marketing systems, 
certain sections in the chain observed that the Nile Perch export fishery has had positive 
impacts as well as negative ones for fish dependent communities and the country as a 
whole. 
 
On the positive side, most communities generally agree that fish export trade increased the 
fishers’ income through increased fish prices, compared to the period before liberalisation. 
According to the communities, the export boom and the resultant increase in fish prices 
acted as an incentive to other communities, as a result of which the number of people 
acquiring fishing licenses increased.  At the same time, it was reported that the income 
increase in the fishing communities often did not lead to local development or investments. 
 
On the negative side, people in the marketing chain also believe that international fish trade 
led to an exposure of local and regional markets.  A concern is that exports of Nile perch and 
even other fish species has left low income communities with no fish to eat, or only bones 
and other bye-products.  In the same light it has been indicated that the average increase of 
fish prices discriminates against the poor, resulting in a food security problem.  
 
Source: Keizire (2004), in Bostock et al (2004) 
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Case Study - A Woman Fish Processing Worker in Khulna, Bangladesh 
 
Amina is a woman processing worker in her thirties and married with a son. She used to live 
in a village in Dumuria upazilla of Khulna district. Her husband is a shrimp cultivation worker 
who works in a shrimp Gher (farm). She used to work in a processing depot nearby her 
village. Processing depots were mostly situated near the villages so that women workers 
could easily come and work there. Now after the introduction of HACCP measures, the 
processing has shifted to urban factories. Since Amina was a processing worker and there 
was no suitable job for her in the shrimp cultivation, she too had to shift from her village to 
the town where factories are situated. Now she is working in Sigma Sea Foods Ltd., and 
lives in a hostel of the factory with other workers. It was a bit difficult for her to make such 
arrangements since she had to leave her family behind. This change has created structural 
inconveniences and economic problems. First, she is now detached from her family and is 
deprived of a regular family life. Second, her cost of living has increased as she has to 
manage two families now - one on her own in the town and the other in the village. Moreover, 
she has to travel once or twice a month to her village home to meet her family, which 
involves a cost. She has to spend about 300 taka (US$ 5) for each travel to her village. Third, 
there is a peak and off-peak season in the shrimp industry. When she used to live in the 
village she was involved in a number of activities like rearing cattle, poultry, homestead 
plantations etc., which are mostly managed by women in the villages of Bangladesh. These 
brought some extra money during the off-peak season. But after the shift to the urban factory 
there is no one to look after her livestock or plants.  As a result, in the off-peak season she 
faces a financial crisis since she cannot earn any extra income now. One positive impact of 
HACCP is that Amina can now concentrate more on her work, which was a bit difficult earlier 
due to her responsibility towards the family. Now she can work longer and thus earns more 
money. However, as mentioned earlier the increased living cost and loss of income from 
homestead activities due to the change in family structure cannot be made up by this extra 
income from slightly longer working hours.               
Source: Khatun (2004), in Bostock et al (2004) 
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Appendix 7: European Fisheries Fund 
 
Source: http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l66004.htm (19 March 2007) 
 
This Regulation establishes a new European Fisheries Fund (EFF) for the 
period 2007-13. It sets the Fund's objectives and priorities plus the 
responsibilities under it and the financial framework. It also sets out the 
arrangements for programming, managing, monitoring and monitoring the 
EFF. The new Fund provides financial assistance to help implement the latest 
reform of the common fisheries policy (CFP) and to support the restructuring 
that has become necessary as the sector has developed. 
 
ACT 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1198/2006 of 27 July 2006 on the European Fisheries 
Fund. 
SUMMARY 
To implement the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP ), the EFF may grant financial support to 
meet the economic, environmental and social goals in order to: 
• ensure the long-term future of fishing activities and the sustainable use of fishery 
resources;  
• reduce pressure on stocks by matching EU fleet capacity to available fishery 
resources;  
• promote the sustainable development of inland fishing;  
• help boost economically viable enterprises in the fisheries sector and make operating 
structures more competitive;  
• foster the protection of the environment and marine resources;  
• encourage sustainable development and improve the quality of life in areas with an 
active fishing industry;  
• promote equality between women and men active in the fisheries sector.  
Priorities  
The EFF provides for five priorities: 
• measures to adapt the EU fishing fleet: financial assistance will be available to 
fishermen and fishing vessel owners affected by the measures taken to combat 
overfishing or to protect public health to help them temporarily or permanently lay up 
fishing vessels and to train, re-skill and provide early retirement to fishermen. Vessels 
that are permanently laid up, in addition to those already due for scrapping, may be 
reused for other non-fishing activities or for the creation of artificial reefs. The EFF 
may contribute to improving working conditions, the quality of products, energy yield 
and catch selectivity. It may also contribute towards replacing engines, providing non-
renewable compensation to fishermen affected by permanent cessation of fishing 
activities and for premiums for young fishermen to buy their first fishing vessel. 
However, financial assistance may in no circumstances lead to an increase in the 
catch capacity or the power of the fishing vessel's engine;  
• aquaculture, inland fishing, processing and marketing:  
the EFF will promote the purchase and use of gear and methods that reduce the 
impact of fishing on the environment and improve human and animal health and 
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safety and the quality of produce. Assistance will be limited to micro, small and 
medium enterprises rather than a few large enterprises. Priority will be given to micro 
and small enterprises;  
• collective action: the following projects will be eligible for aid: those which contribute 
to the sustainable development or conservation of resources, to improving the 
services offered by fishing ports, to strengthening markets in fishery products and to 
promoting partnerships between scientists and operators in the fisheries sector;  
• sustainable development of coastal fishing areas: the EFF will support measures 
and initiatives aimed at diversifying and strengthening economic development in 
areas affected by the decline in fishing activities.  
• technical assistance: the Fund may finance initiatives involving preparations, 
monitoring, administrative and technical support, evaluation, audit and checks 
needed to implement the proposed Regulation.  
Programming *  
One of the main objectives of the EFF is to simplify the allocation and management of 
funding. Member States must send the Commission a strategic plan and an operational 
programme in order to benefit from assistance under the EFF. 
The national strategic plans must set out the national priorities and objectives to implement 
the CFP. The Commission will organise a debate with Member States by 31 December 2011 
to assess the progress made in implementing the strategic plans on the basis of the 
information it receives. 
The strategic plans will form a basis for the operational programmes, which will implement 
the policies and priorities to be co-financed by the EFF. The Commission will approve the 
operational programmes by issuing a decision, after having checked that they are in line with 
the objectives of the EFF. If necessary, it may require that the operational programmes be 
modified. 
The operational programmes will be assessed in three stages. Member States are 
responsible for forecast and interim assessments whilst the Commission is responsible for 
the final assessment of the programme's effectiveness. The part of the budget reserved for 
technical assistance may be used to finance these assessments.  
Responsibilities 
The Regulation defines the responsibilities of the Member States and of the Commission 
concerning the EFF. In particular, Member States are tasked with informing the general 
public, potential beneficiaries and stakeholders of the opportunities available under the EFF 
to ensure that the Fund is used in a transparent manner and to underline the role of the EU.  
Financial framework 
The EFF has a budget of 3 849 million for the period 2007-13. Over that period the 
Commission proposes to allocate 538 - 556 million per year to all the 25 Member States. 
The amounts will be divided between the Member States according to the size of their 
fisheries sector, the number of people working in the sector, the adjustments considered 
necessary for the fishing industry and continuity of the measures in hand. 
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Except for certain expenditure incurred by the Commission that is 100% covered by the EFF, 
the maximum contribution of the EFF is always calculated as a proportion of the total sum of 
all public expenditure. It varies according to the priority of the initiative and will be higher for 
the most disadvantaged regions and for the new Member States, i.e. those covered by the 
new ‘convergence’ objective under the Structural Funds. The intensity of public aid 
authorised for each operation financed also varies according to the same parameters (see 
Annex II to the Regulation). 
The Regulation sets the rules governing eligibility of expenditure (Article 55), financial 
management, financial corrections, budgetary appropriations and reimbursement. It 
establishes a Committee of the European Fisheries Fund to assist the Commission in 
managing the EFF.  
Management, monitoring and control 
Each Member State must appoint the following bodies before requests for payment can be 
submitted: 
• a managing authority for the programme to select and monitor initiatives to be 
financed;  
• a certification authority to verify that expenditure complies with EU rules;  
• an audit authority to verify the proper functioning of the managing and certification 
authorities;  
• a monitoring committee, which a representative of the Commission participates in for 
advisory purposes and which assesses progress in reaching the objectives of the 
operational programme.  
Each year the managing authorities must send the Commission an annual report, to which 
the Commission replies with its comments. The Commission summarises these reports in its 
own annual report which it sends to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. The Member States 
must also send a final report on the implementation of the operational programme before 31 
March 2017. 
 
